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Abstract
This Essay discusses the post-settlement process following the claims made against Union
Bank of Switzerland (“UBS”) and Credit Suisse by survivors of the Holocaust and their heirs. The
author analyzes the settlement and provides both a legal and moral accounting of this litigation.
This Essay is a continuation of the author’s earlier writings on the subject.
www.swissbankclaims.com: THE LEGALITY
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ERA SETTLEMENT WITH THE
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INTRODUCTION
August 13, 1998 marks a milestone in American law. On
that day, Union Bank of Switzerland ("UBS") and Credit Suisse,
the two largest banks in Switzerland and one of the largest bank-
ing concerns in the world, announced that they would pay
U.S.$1.25 billion to settle three class action lawsuits brought
against them two years earlier in federal court in Brooklyn, New
York. The settlement was remarkable for a number of reasons.
First, at the time, this was the largest settlement of a human
rights case in United States history.' Moreover, the settlement
involved events over a half-century old, going back prior to
World War II. In no other case in the history of American litiga-
tion had so much time passed between the events upon which
the claims were based and the settlement of the litigation. Fi-
nally, the Swiss banks settlement led to a throng of other lawsuits
filed against European-and even American-corporations for
their nefarious activities during the war.2 In the next three-and-
one half years, these other Holocaust restitution lawsuits also
concluded. The Holocaust-era restitution litigation-began by
the Swiss banks lawsuits-has now yielded settlements of over
U.S.$8 billion.
I have detailed elsewhere the claims made against the Swiss
* Professor of Law, Whittier Law School, Costa Mesa, CA and Research Fellow,
Holocaust Educational Trust, London, U.K. bazyler@aol.com The views expressed herein
are those of the author, and not necessarily those of the Holocaust Educational Trust.
Portions of this Essay will appear in a forthcoming book on the Holocaust restitution
movement, to be published by New York University Press.
1. It has since been surpassed by another Holocaust-era restitution settlement: the
agreement by German companies and the German government in December 1999 to
pay ten billion German marks (approximately U.S.$5 billion) arising from the compa-
nies' use of slave labor and related activities during World War II. See Michael J.
Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating The Holocaust in United States Courts, 34 U. RICH.
L. REV. 1, 191-236 (2000).
2. For a discussion of these other lawsuits, see Michael J. Bazyler, Holocaust Restitu-
tion in Comparative Perspective, 21 BERKELEYJ. INT'L. L. (forthcoming 2001).
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banks.' Briefly, the banks were accused of failing to return to
their rightful owners or heirs monies deposited with them for
safekeeping prior to, and on the eve of, World War II. The de-
positors, it was alleged, were victims of the Holocaust, primarily
European Jews. The banks were also accused of earning substan-
tial profits in their dealings with the Nazis; by acting as launder-
ers of (1) gold stolen by the Nazis from the central banks of
occupied Europe and individual victims (the so-called "Nazi
gold"); (2) other assets stolen by the Nazis which made their way
into Switzerland; and (3) goods produced by slave labor which
the Nazis also sold in Switzerland. According to a United States
government report, the Swiss role as "bankers for the Nazis" pro-
longed the war by at least one year, since it enabled the Nazi
regime to purchase goods and other war materiel, which other-
wise would have been unavailable to it.4
This Essay begins where my previous writings left off. Part I
discusses the post-settlement process, which took longer than
the actual litigation itself. Part II analyzes the settlement and
provides both a legal and moral accounting of this litigation.
The most important documentation of the settlement, in-
cluding the post-settlement pleadings and documents, is located
in the court-created website-http://www.swissbankclaims.
com-authorized by Judge Edward Korman, the federal judge
presiding over the litigation. Hence, the title of this Essay.
3. See Michael J. Bazyler, Holocaust Restitution in the United States.- The Search for Jus-
tice, in REMEMBERING FOR THE FUTURE: THE HOLOCAUST IN AN AGE OF GENOCIDE 845-59
(John K. Roth & Elisabeth Maxwell eds., 2001); Bazyler, supra note 1, at 31-91 (2000);
Michael J. Bazyler, Litigating the Holocaust, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 601, 607-09 (1999).
4. See William Z. Slany, U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other
Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany During World War II (May 1997), available at http://
www.state.gov/regions/eur/rpt_9705_ng-links.html. The Swiss-government created
Bergier historical commission reached a similar conclusion. See Michael Maupin, Passive
Facilitation (Bergier Commission Studies Swiss Role in WWII), Swiss NEWS, Oct. 1, 2001, avail-
able at 2001 WL 17841946 ("The Bergier Commission assigned the task of re-assessing
Switzerland's role during World War 2, has come to the conclusion that Switzerland
facilitated Nazi Germany and the Axis forces through its financial services provided
during the war"). In addition to the accusations against both the private Swiss banks
and the government's Swiss National Bank for their financial dealings with the Nazis,
the wartime Swiss government was accused of closing the Swiss border to many refugees
of Nazi occupied lands and also ejecting some of the refugees who were lucky enough
to make their way into neutral Switzerland. As I explain elsewhere, these refugee claims
became part of the Swiss banks settlement, even though the Swiss government was not a
party to the settlement. Bazyler, supra note 1, at 81.
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I. THE PROBLEMS OF DISTRIBUTION "IT'S NOT OVER TIL
IT'S OVER"
As the settlement negotiations with the Swiss banks were
coming to a close, one lawyer intimately involved with the pro-
cess worried that, following the settlement, the worst was yet to
come.
You've got the general European Jews, the Eastern European
Jews. You've got the government of Israel; you've got
thousands of individual survivors; you've got all kinds of other
groups, arguing that portions of the money should be set
aside for different purposes in the Jewish community. It's not
going to be an easy task. The fight against the Swiss is going
to be nothing compared to the attempt to mediate the vari-
ous interests.5
Unfortunately, the lawyer was right, but only partially. It
took over three years to finalize the settlement and distribute the
monies to the claimants, longer than the actual litigation against
the Swiss banks. Some of the delays were avoidable; others were
not. Many factors contributed to the delays; infighting, however,
was not one of them.
As the parties envisioned the settlement in mid-August,
1998, distribution of the funds to survivors would start soon after
the Swiss banks would make each of their four installment pay-
ments, beginning with the first payment on November 23, 1998.
The elderly claimants would not have to wait until November 23,
2001, when the banks would make the final installment, to col-
lect the funds. Professor Burt Neuborne, special counsel for the
plaintiffs whom Judge Korman later appointed as plaintiffs' lead
settlement counsel,6 strongly believed at the time of the settle-
ment that the banks would make their payments ahead of sched-
ule, thereby putting the matter behind them.
Nothing of the sort happened. While the Swiss banks duti-
fully made their four scheduled payments, they nevertheless in-
terjected significant obstacles that delayed distribution. 7 As a re-
5. Susan Orenstein, Gold Warriors: The Inside Story of the Historic $1.25 Billion Settle-
ment Between Holocaust Victims and the Swiss Banks, AM. LAWYER, Sept. 1998, at 62, 64
(quoting a lawyer on the executive committee handling the case for the survivors).
6. Neuborne, law professor at New York University School of Law, reviewed a draft
of this Essay and provided helpful written comments. I cite to those comments in the
course of this essay.
7. See infta text following notes 43-50.
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sult, the monies remained stuck in a court-created escrow ac-
count.
By the time the first payments went out in late 2001, many
of the survivors who joyously hailed the settlement in mid-1998
had died, still awaiting their check. Othersjust gave up, exasper-
ated not only by the numerous delays, but also with the compli-
cated forms they were made to fill out in order receive the settle-
ment proceeds.
Some of the seeds causing the long delays were planted at
the time of the settlement. Essentially, the parties failed to work
out many of the critical details when they announced the his-
toric settlement in August 1998. These details later came to
haunt them. Of course, with the September 1, 1998 deadline for
the issuance of further sanctions against the Swiss banks looming
just two weeks away, the parties in the litigation cannot be
blamed for settling the case without first working out these
thorny issues. This mentality, however, of "let's just take the
money and run" created a host of problems, which haunted
Judge Korman and all the parties over the next three years.
Other delays just could not be avoided, being the usual con-
sequence of having to follow U.S. federal court rules, especially
complex requirements dealing with class action litigation. These
rules, with their emphasis on assuring fairness and avoiding
prejudice to any actual or potential claimant, naturally slowed
down the post-settlement process and delayed distribution of any
settlement funds.' Lawyers are accustomed to these post-settle-
8. Another unavoidable delay was the ability of any potentially aggrieved claimant
to appeal the settlement. For example, three claimants, two appearing pro se, filed an
appeal to Judge Korman's November 22, 2000 order approving the plan of distribution
of the settlement proceeds. That appeal was not decided by the Second Circuit until
July 26, 2001. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, Nos. 00-9595(CON), 00-9597
(CON), 2001 WL 868507 (2d Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion) (citations omitted).
Earlier, a group of ethnic Polish survivors filed an appeal, objecting to the exclusion of
ethnic Poles from the settlement. That appeal was dismissed on September 21, 2000.
See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 225 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2000).
According to Professor Neuborne, "Distribution could not take place until the
close of the fairness appeals process. It took us almost a year to navigate the fairness
appeals process .... Frankly, it is a minor miracle that the legal and practical hurdles
were surmounted in three years." Email memo from Burt Neuborne to author (Nov.
27, 2001) para. 1, at 1 (on file with author).
Neuborne also explains:
[One cannot] underestimate the enormous difficulty in implementing the set-
dement. [Paragraph] The delays were attributable to: (1) the difficulty of
drafting an unprecedently complicated settlement agreement covering five
S-6720011
S-68 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:S-64
ment delays; laymen find them frustrating.
The post-settlement resolution process had an inauspicious
start, a sign of worse things to come. It took the parties more
than five months after the settlement was orally agreed upon
and preliminarily approved by Judge Korman in open court in
August 1998 to finalize the written settlement agreement.
After the settlement agreement was finally signed on Janu-
ary 26, 1999,Judge Korman laid out a timetable under which the
nearly 900,000 potential beneficiaries, the class members on
whose behalf the suits were filed, were to be notified of the set-
tlement. The class action notices went out in early summer
1999. A potential claimant had until October 22, 1999 to opt
out of the settlement if the claimant still wanted to pursue an
individual action against the Swiss banks.
The duty to notify potential beneficiaries of a class action
settlement is legally required for all U.S. class actions. In this
case, however, the notification process was, as described by the
Los Angeles Times, "the most ambitious effort ever to notify poten-
tial beneficiaries of a legal settlement."9 Since the potential re-
cipients of the Swiss funds could be anywhere in the world, ad-
vertisements announcing the settlement were published in 500
newspapers, in over forty countries, and in languages ranging
from Albanian to Yiddish. Toll-free telephone information lines
were created in each of the countries. For the computer literate,
an official website was created, http://www.swissbankclaims.com,
in which every court document, beginning with theJanuary 1999
Settlement Agreement, was posted. The website itself is trans-
lated into twenty languages. A San Francisco-based company
specializing in class action notification was hired as a Notice Ad-
ministrator to interface with the claimants.
Judge Korman allocated U.S.$25 million, or two percent of
classes and an entire nation; (2) fierce resistance by the Swiss banks to provid-
ing information that would help us find account holders and other claimants;
(3) the need to coordinate with the Volcker process; (4) the enormous task of
notifying potential claimants; (5) the need to hold complex fairness hearings
involving five classes; (6) the need to develop an allocation program that
would be both fair and capable of administration; (7) the effort to coordinate
the allocation plan with the emerging German Foundation; and (8) the need
to deal with three waves of appeals to the Second Circuit.
Id.
9. Henry Weinstein, Search Opens for Holocaust Claimants, L.A. TiMES, June 29, 1999,
at A3.
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the U.S.$1.25 billion settlement, for notification and other distri-
bution expenses. Before the case was finally concluded, the en-
tire U.S.$25 million was spent.
On June 9, 1999, Professor Neuborne, chief settlement
counsel, sent the first in a series of letters to the claimants. In
the letter, Neuborne apologized for the delays that had already
taken place, and warned of further impediments in the future:
All of us who have worked on this Settlement regret that we
cannot move more quickly in distributing the funds. It is our
duty, however, to assure that everyone affected by the Settle-
ment is given a chance to comment on its fairness, and to
have an opportunity to express an opinion about the fairest
way to allocate and distribute the funds. That takes time...
[b]ecause we all feel so deeply about the Holocaust, we want
this process to treat every survivor with scrupulous fairness.1 °
Two days later, on June 11, 1999, the official "Notice of Pen-
dency of Class Action and Proposed Settlement and Hearing,"
likewise required by class action court rules, was mailed out to
every person responding to the newspaper notices or contacting
the website. The notice contained an "Initial Questionnaire,"
which claimants were asked to fill out to register their claim.
The questionnaire immediately came under heavy criticism.
It was long and complicated; most seriously, it asked claimants to
recount in detail their Holocaust experiences. Elihu Kover, di-
rector of a New York agency helping aging survivors fill out the
questionnaire, explained: "Clients look at this twenty page thing
and they don't understand it. It's not like filling out a welfare
application. It's an emotional issue. This is pretty complicated
and stressful.""
Eventually, a total of 580,000 Initial Questionnaires were
10. Letter to potential claimants from Burt Neuborne (June 9, 1999), available at
http://www.swissbankclaims.com.
11. Marilyn Henry, Notification Plan Misleads Survivors, JERUSALEM PosT, Aug. 15,
1999, at 3 (quoting Elihu Kover). Kover was exaggerating when he stated that the Ini-
tial Questionnaire was 20 pages. It fact, it was six pages. An elderly couple in Los
Angeles, both Auschwitz survivors, asked me to help them fill out the form. It took a
few hours. The wife started to cry when she began to recount her arrival, and the
selection process, at Auschwitz. That was the last time she saw her mother and infant
nephew, who perished in the gas chambers. We were all exhausted when the evening
ended.
2001] S-69
S-70 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:S-64
submitted. 12
On November 29, 1999, Judge Korman held a "fairness
hearing," to determine whether the U.S.$1.25 billion settlement
was "fair, adequate and reasonable"-again a requirement of
class action rules. Of course, in this case, the result was pre-
ordained. Since Korman back in August 1998 approved the set-
tlement in principle, it would be unlikely that he would now re-
ject it-unless, of course, the parties had made substantial revi-
sions to the settlement they presented to him in open court
fifteen months earlier.
Nevertheless, the hearing brought up problems that had
not been envisioned when the parties were finalizing their
deal. 3
In addition to the court hearing in his Brooklyn courtroom,
Korman also scheduled a hearing the next month, a supplemen-
tal hearing for the Holocaust survivors in Israel. The hearing
was held through a teleconference, so the Israeli survivors would
not have to come to the United States to be heard.
On August 9, 2000, two years after the initial settlement,
Korman signed his final order and judgment approving the Set-
tlement Agreement as fair, adequate, and reasonable.14
As Judge Korman discusses in his memorandum opinion ap-
proving the settlement, the journey to reaching this stage was
not an easy one, including a last minute threat by the Swiss
banks to pull out of the settlement agreement. 5
12. Letter from Judah Gribetz and Shari C. Reig to author (Dec. 19, 2001), at 2
(on file with author).
13. For example, individuals appeared at the hearing claiming that the Swiss were
still holding Nazi-stolen art belonging to them. Under the Sttlement Agreement, these
art claims would be extinguished through the Swiss banks settlements. Judge Korman,
in response, modified the settlement to keep open these art claims. In re Holocaust
Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 158-60 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
14. Id.
15. "IJ]ust as I was ready to release this opinion last week, counsel for the
defendant banks threatened to repudiate the modifications [to the Settle-
ment Agreement] because he was unhappy with certain good faith obligations
imposed upon the releasees information necessary to allow members of the
plaintiff class to obtain the benefits of the Settlement Agreement. . . . My
initial discussion of the Settlement Agreement assumes that defendants Union
Bank of Switzerland and Credit Suisse will act responsibly and adhere to the
modifications."
Id. at 145. Subsequently, they did. For discussion, in judge Korman's opinion, of other
delays caused by the Swiss banks on the road to final approval of the settlement, see infta
note 45.
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The thorniest issue now was how to allocate the U.S.$1.25
billion. To assist him with this task, in 1998, Judge Korman ap-
pointed Judah Gribetz, a respected Jewish community leader
and counsel to former New York Governor Hugh Carey, as "Spe-
cial Master" to work out an allocation plan. 6 Gribetz's unenvi-
able task was to receive written suggestions about how to divide
the funds and issue a plan of allocation which Korman would
then approve. Anyone could submit a suggestion, and Gribetz
received over 1,000 comments on how to allocate the funds.
In September 2000, Gribetz submitted to Judge Korman his
Proposed Plan of Allocation and Distribution; the plan totaled
over 900 pages.1 7
In setting out his allocation plan, Gribetz did not have free
reign on how to distribute the U.S.$1.25 billion. Rather, he was
constrained by the limitations on distribution already set out in
the Settlement Agreement finalized by the parties in January
1999.
That Agreement contained terms which both surprised and
angered many who were following the litigation. Most curious,
the Agreement did not just limit eligible claimants to Jews.
Rather, in addition to Jewish victims or heirs, it added four other
groups persecuted by the Nazis who would share in the settle-
ment proceeds: (1) homosexuals; (2) physically or mentally dis-
abled or handicapped persons; (3) the Romani (Gypsy) peoples;
and (4) Jehovah's Witnesses. These five categories of eligible
claimants18 were given the lauded status in the Agreement as
"Victims or Targets of Nazi Persecution" ("VTNP").
16. Gribetz and his colleague Shari C. Reig reviewed a draft of this Essay and pro-
vided very helpful suggestions. I have attempted to incorporate those suggestions
throughout the Essay.
17. To help elderly claimants understand the long and detailed distribution plan,
Gribetz issued a 38-page overview and a seven-page summary of the plan. In addition, a
set of "Frequently Asked Questions" and answers were posted on the Swiss banks settle-
ment website, http://www.swissbankclaims.com.
18. The Settlement Agreement did not limit the Victims or Targets of Nazi Perse-
cution ("VTNP") claimants to individuals. Rather, VTNP "means any individual, corpo-
ration, partnership, sole proprietorship, unincorporated association, community, con-
gregation, group, organization, or other entity persecuted or targeted for persecution
by the Nazi Regime because they were or believed to be Jewish, Romani, Jehovah's
Witness, homosexual, or physically or mentally disabled or handicapped." Settlement
Agreement, sec. 1 (entitled "Definitions"). For significance of this expanded defini-
tion, see infra note 30.
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The expansion to these four other groups, however, was
both over- and under-inclusive.
It was over-inclusive because throughout the course of the
litigation, the common understanding was that the lawsuits
against the Swiss banks were filed on behalf ofJewish victims. All
of the named plaintiffs in the lawsuits before Judge Korman
were Jewish survivors.19 Also, only Jewish groups participated in
the litigation and settlement negotiations. Lastly, the parties'
briefs uniformly labeled the class members as being victims of
"the Holocaust"-the term referring to the killing and persecu-
tion of European Jewry during World War I1.20
This belief-that only Jews would recover in the Swiss class
action litigation-continued even at the time of the August 1998
settlement. Press releases announcing the settlement lauded the
benefits that Holocaust survivors would be receiving from the
resolution of the litigation.21
Little attention was paid, however, to the fact that the class
of plaintiffs designated in all but one of the complaints against
the Swiss banks (the World Council of Orthodox Jewish Commu-
nities was filed only on behalf ofJewish victims), categorized the
claimants as being both Jewish and non-Jewish. Credit or blame
goes to the plaintiffs' lawyers. Not able to predict which catego-
ries of plaintiffs would ultimately succeed in the litigation, the
lawyers, upon filing the suits, took the safest route and defined
the class members on whose behalf they were suing as broadly as
possible.
After the settlement was announced, these broad allegations
in the complaints and pressure by non-Jewish victims to receive a
19. In the late stage of the litigation, to increase pressure upon the Swiss banks, a
parallel lawsuit was filed against the Swiss banks in California. That lawsuit contained
one named plaintiff who was notJewish, an elderly Romani (Gypsy) victim of the Nazis,
now living in California. Bazyler, supra note 1, at 58. As part of the overall Swiss settle-
ment, that California lawsuit was later dismissed. This was the only non-Jewish named
plaintiff in any of the suits against the Swiss banks. Moreover, none of the suits ever
contained any of the other three classes of VTNP claimants-homosexuals, physically
or mentally handicapped, orJehovah's witnesses-as plaintiffs.
20. See Bazyler, supra note 1, at 6 n.4 (discussing the meaning of the term "Holo-
caust").
21. For instance, the press release from one of the leading law firms announcing
the August 13, 1998 settlement stated: "[i]n a historic, unprecedented legal settlement,
Swiss private banks will pay Holocaust survivors $1.25 billion to settle legal claims arising
from the banks' conduct during and after World War II." Cohen et al., E-Journal, at
http://www.cmht.com/ipsltmt.htm (emphasis added).
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portion of the funds prompted the settling parties to expand the
categories of beneficiaries of the Swiss settlement to include
some-but not all-non-Jewish victims.
22
Having opened the door for non-Jewish victims to share in
the Swiss settlement, the settling parties excluded groups who
also rightly fit the VTNP label. Most significantly, the settlement
excluded the entire category of Slavic peoples-primarily Poles
and Russians-who suffered horribly at the hands of the Nazis.23
These individuals, of course, were just as entitled to the share of
the proceeds as the individuals labeled in the Settlement Agree-
ment as VTNPs.24
The decision to include some non-Jewish victims and ex-
clude others was made by the plaintiffs' lawyers and senior
22. Professor Neurborne disagrees with my analysis. He states:
It is inaccurate to trace the existence of non-Jewish beneficiaries to outside
pressure, to strategic judgment by lawyers. It was a moral judgment by the
lawyers, coupled with the desire by the Swiss banks to obtain the broadest pos-
sible releases. The notion that the inclusion of non-Jews in the settlement was
a surprise is simply inaccurate. The negotiators never considered limiting the
settlement to Jewish victims. We tested that idea with the leaders of the Jewish
community and received unanimous support for the idea of opening the set-
tlement fund to gypsies, Jehova's Witnesses, gays and the disabled.
Email memo from Burt Neuborne to author (Nov. 27, 2001) para. 2, at 1 (on file with
author).
23. Of the more than 19 million Slavic persons murdered by the Nazis, 12.2 mil-
lion came from the USSR and 5.4 million from Poland. R.J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY Gov-
ERNMENT 12 (1994).
24. Professor Neuborne disagrees.
Your suggestion that Poles or Russians had a 'right' to participate in the settle-
ment is wrong as a matter of law, and wrong as a matter of morality. It's wrong
to state that the excluded victims were remitted to the German Foundation.
We made certain that Slavs were not precluded from bringing their own law-
suit against the Swiss banks. Indeed, we offered to make all of our research
available to Slavs who wished to file a parallel suit on behalf of their commu-
nity. Judge Korman urged the Slavs to file a separate complaint. The Second
Circuit made it clear that excluding Slavs under those conditions was perfectly
legal. I believe that it was moral as well.
Email memo from Burt Neuborne to author (Nov. 27, 2001) para. 2 at 2 (on file with
author). For the Second Circuit decision affirmingJudge Korman's exclusion of ethnic
Poles from the settlement, see In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 225 F.3d 191
(2d Cir. 2000). The Second Circuit pointed out that ethnic Poles could still file their
own separate lawsuit against the Swiss banks, and, as Professor Neuborne points out,
were encouraged to do so by Judge Korman. Id. at 199. The ethnic Poles never did.
Whether they could have forged another settlement with the Swiss banks on top of the
U.S.$1.25 billion settlement already obtained in this litigation remains unknown. I
would think it unlikely that the Swiss banks would have been willing to pay anything
more after agreeing to this settlement.
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World Jewish Congress ("WJC") officials. Professor Burt
Neuborne explained how the cut-off was made:
We had to walk a line between everyone harmed by the Na-
zis-which is virtually all of Europe-or only the Jews. Both
extremes were unacceptable. The first would have so diluted
the recovery it would have rendered the whole suit meaning-
less. The second would have made it unfairly parochial.2 5
The excluded victims had to console themselves with the
hope of future recovery from the ongoing slave labor litigation
against the German firms. As it turned out, the actual distribu-
tion of funds from both the Swiss and German settlements oc-
curred at about the same time, even though the Swiss banks set-
tled a year-and-a-half before the German firms.26 Because of the
various delays in the distribution of the Swiss settlement funds,
the non-Jewish VTNPs in the Swiss settlement did not fare any
better than the non-Jewish beneficiaries of the German settle-
ment. Jewish survivors, eligible to receive funds from both the
Swiss and German settlements, received their settlement checks
almost concurrently-even though the Swiss litigation concluded
eighteen months earlier.
Gribetz's actual dollar figure allocations for each VTNP
class also followed closely the categories of claimants set out in
the Settlement Agreement.
The first set of claimants were individuals seeking to recover
monies deposited with the Swiss banks for safekeeping prior to,
or during, the war. Claimants to these dormant accounts were
designated in the Settlement Agreement as the "Deposited As-
sets Class." Since the original purpose of the Swiss banks litiga-
tion was to obtain the return of these funds, Gribetz felt bound
25. Henry Weinstein, Holocaust Survivors, Swiss Banks OK Settlement, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
23, 1999 at A13. Neuborne further explains:
The principle of victim solidarity was very important to me. If the Swiss banks
had increased the settlement, I would gladly have included Slavs, as well. We
just couldn't do it with $1.25 billion. I §ought to compensate by assuring that
Slavs were treated fairly in the German Foundation settlement. I don't pur-
port to be an expert, but I challenge the idea that only Jews suffered in the
Holocaust.
Email memo from Burt Neuborne to author (Nov. 27, 2001) para. 2, at 2 (on file with
author).
26. See Roger Cohen, Last Chapter: Berlin to Pay Slave Workers Held by Nazis, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2001, at Al; see also Key Dates in Nazi Slave Labour Talks,JERUSALEM POST,
May 31, 2001, at 7, available at 2001 WL 6608267.
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to allocate the largest portion of the settlement-U.S.$800 mil-
lion-to this class of claimants.27 The amount may turn out to
be more than needed to cover all the bank claims. One early
indicator: only about twenty percent of those who completed
the Initial Questionnaire made a claim for deposited bank assets,
but with only six percent being able to name the Swiss bank pur-
portedly holding the dormant deposited assets. 28 To cover that
27. Gribetz aimed to give priority to these bank claimants; and Judge Korman
agreed with this position. "As contemplated by the Settlement Agreement, the Pro-
posed Plan appropriately placed priority upon returning to their rightful owners the
sums that Swiss banks have been holding for them for more than half a century. Pro-
posed Plan at 12." In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 2000 WL 33241660 (E.D.N.Y.
2000) (Judge Korman's November 22, 2000 Order confirming Plan of Allocation).
Gribetz adopted the U.S.$800 million cap for the payout on these accounts based upon
the Volcker Report estimate that the total value of these dormant accounts ranges be-
tween U.S.$643 million and U.S.$1.254 billion. The U.S.$800 million figure is an
amount closer to the lower end of the range in the Volcker Report. Judge Korman
adopted Gribetz's estimate. Id.
Following the approval of Gribetz's plan by Judge Korman, three claimants filed an
appeal, two challenging the allocation of U.S.$800 million to the "deposited assets"
class. The Second Circuit rejected the challenge, explaining as follows:
We also find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allocating
$800 million to the "Deposited Assets" class. The existence and estimated
value of the claimed deposit accounts was established by extensive forensic
accounting. In addition, these claims are based on well-established legal prin-
ciples, have the ability of being proved with concrete documentation, and are
readily valuated in terms of time and inflation. By contrast, the claims of the
other four classes are based on novel and untested legal theories of liability,
would have been very difficult to prove at trial, and will be very difficult to
accurately valuate. Any allocation of a settlement of this magnitude and com-
prising such different types of claims must be based, at least in part, on the
comparative strengths and weaknesses of the asserted legal claims.
In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, Nos. 00-9595(CON), 00-9597 (CON), 2001 WL
868507 (2d Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion) (citations omitted).
The Second Circuit also dismissed the argument that the U.S.$1.25 billion was an
inadequate settlement.
The settlement sum of $1.25 billion, which was the result of more than a year
of negotiations conducted among the parties and moderated by the district
court, was premised in part on economic analyses that estimated the Jewish
wealth likely to have flowed into Swiss banks on the eve of the Holocaust. The
district court's approval of the sum after such extensive negotiations and con-
sidered analysis was not an abuse of discretion.
Id.
28. Marilyn Henry, Over Half a Million Claimants Against Swiss Banks Settlement, JERU-
SALEM POST, Mar. 19, 2000, at 3, available at 2000 WL 8255267. Of course, both the low
figure of the total number of claimants seeking return of deposited funds, and the
inability of many of those seeking those funds to name a specific Swiss bank where the
monies are being held, is due to the banks' refusal to issue more complete lists of their
wartime dormant accounts. Without a complete list of such dormant accounts, heirs or
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contingency, which now appears likely,29 Gribetz recommended
that any unused portion of the U.S.$800 million be allocated to
the other groups of claimants.3 0
While the gravamen of the original complaints was to accuse
the Swiss banks of failing to return monies deposited with them
survivors may never learn whether monies belonging to them are being held in Switzer-
land in some dormant account. As Judge Korman explained in his opinion approving
the settlement:
Indeed, it is only the successful campaign that the Swiss banks waged to pre-
vent disclosure before records were destroyed [citing the Volcker Report] that
gave rise to the legal and practical impediments to the successful litigation of
this case by the vast majority of individuals to whom money is justly due.
In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 153-54 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
Further, had all the records been available on the dormant accounts opened in Swiss
banks between 1933-1945, "the value of the deposited assets held by the Swiss banks
could exceed the $1.25 billion settlement amount." Id. at 153 (citing to the Volcker
Report).
It is puzzling why the Swiss banks would now decline to publish more complete
lists. Under the settlement, their financial exposure is limited to U.S.$1.25 billion, re-
gardless of how many dormant account claimants appear as a result of increased publi-
cation and dissemination of information regarding Swiss wartime dormant accounts.
29. As the Financial Times reported,
[t]his week marked the closing date for people who thought they might have
one of the [Swiss] dormant accounts to submit a claims .... Only 25,000
claims were received by the deadline.... This was a surprisingly low number
as 85,000 people had answered an earlier questionnaire saying they might
have a claim to a Swiss account. Of the 25,000 claims made by this week's
deadline, only 20%, or about 5,000, staked a claim to one of the account
names that had been published. Thus, at least 16,000 of the 21,000 accounts
published earlier this year appear to have gone unclaimed.... Even more
problematically, there are 20,000 people who believe they have accounts not
included in the list published earlier this year. While some have already
waited 56 years for their money, all the indications are that the mess could
take at least another two years to resolve.
John Authers, Judgment Day For Swiss Banks, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2001, available at 2001
WL 25576994. Earlier, Burt Neuborne, plaintiffs' chief settlement counsel, predicted
that "as many as 36,000 survivors may file claims for lost bank accounts . . . ." Daniel
Wise, PanelAffirms Swiss Holocaust Settlement, N.Y.L.J.,July 31, 2001, at 1. With additional
claims coming in close to, and after, the filing deadline, Neuborne's estimate appears
to be correct: over 30,000 claims appear to be made for dormant wartime Swiss bank
accounts.
30. Many Holocaust survivors are greatly troubled by this result, fearing that the
unused portion of the U.S.$800 million will not be going to Holocaust survivors, or
directly for their benefit, but for such projects as building Holocaust memorials, restor-
ingJewish communities in Eastern Europe, or other Holocaust education-type expendi-
tures. See Nacha Cattan, Survivors Seek More Say In Claims Fight, FORWARD, Feb. 16, 2001,
at 4. Organizations seeking funds for such projects can claim, of course, that the Settle-
ment Agreement contemplates their receipt of moneys from the Swiss settlement for
this work, since organizations and other groups are included under the Settlement
Agreement as "Victims or Targets of Nazi Persecution." See supra note 17.
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for safekeeping, the complaints also blamed the banks of engag-
ing in three other types of wrongful conduct during wartime.
First, the Swiss banks were accused of knowingly trading
goods made by slave labor with the Nazis. The banks either pur-
chased those goods directly from the Nazis or financed the im-
portation of such goods into Switzerland. These allegations were
based on the various books published at the time, which exposed
the Swiss banks as being the secret bankers for the Nazis. This
class was designated in the Settlement Agreement as "Slave La-
bor I." '
Second, the lawsuits also alleged that some Swiss companies
directly owned or controlled factories that used slave labor in
Germany or Nazi-occupied Europe. Individuals who worked for
such Swiss-run companies were designated as a separate class,
known as "Slave Labor II."32
Third, the Swiss banks were also accused in the suits of help-
ing the Nazis to launder profits earned from goods looted from
Jews. This class was designated as the "Looted Assets Class." 3
In their pleadings, plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
Swiss banks earned more than U.S.$75 million by knowingly traf-
ficking in looted assets and in assets produced by Nazi slave la-
bor, and that the current value of such profits earned by the
defendant banks was in excess of U.S.$1 billion dollars.
Finally, the Swiss government had earlier admitted that it
denied entry to Jews and other persecuted groups fleeing the
Nazis. The private Swiss bank defendants insisted this so-called
"Refugee Class" be included in the Swiss banks settlement.
34
Now came the hardest part: how to divide up the remaining
U.S.$450 million and accrued interest of approximately
U.S.$100 million among these non-deposited assets groups?
As it turned out, almost all of those who returned initial
questionnaires made claims based upon these latter allegations,
and not for the return of monies deposited in the Swiss banks.
Many of these non-deposit claims came not from survivors them-
selves, but individuals claiming a share as heirs.
Gribetz, along with Neuborne, quickly realized that the list
31. Settlement Agreement, sec. 8.2(c).
32. Id.
33. Id. sec. 8.2(b).
34. Id. sec. 8.2(e).
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of eligible persons for these latter claims would need to be dras-
tically reduced. As they explained,
[T] here is simply not enough money available to make direct
payments to most heirs in the slave labor, refugee and looted
assets classes. Otherwise, so many payments would be re-
quired and so much of the Settlement Fund would be used
up for costly eligibility determinations that everyone essen-
tially would get nothing.
35
Another practical problem was that none of the Holocaust
survivors named as plaintiffs-or for that matter any other survi-
vor-could prove that the benefits the Nazis earned from their
slave labor or looted assets made their way into the Swiss banks'
coffers.
To avoid these practical difficulties, Gribetz recommended
that every person who was a former slave or forced laborer under
the Nazis-and who fit one of the VTNP categories-receive the
same amount: somewhere between U.S.$500 and U.S.$1,000.
The final figure would depend on the number of VNTP claim-
ants applying for these funds. No link to the Swiss needed to be
made by the claimant.36 Proof of being a forced or slave laborer
under the Nazis would suffice.3 7 Heirs of such former laborers
would be excluded. One exception was if an eligible claimant
35. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation (Swiss Banks), Frequently Asked Questions
(Apr. 17, 2001) at 10, available at http://www.swissbankclaims.com.
36. The elderly members of this class therefore are relieved of the burden of
demonstrating precisely which company enslaved them and whether and how
that company channeled revenues or proceeds of their slave labor through a
Swiss entity. The fortuity that the apparent Swiss banking relationships of
many slave labor-using entities has been documented should not prejudice
those class members who performed slave labor for enterprises whose finan-
cial ties to Swiss entities may not yet have been demonstrated with the present
state of research and scholarship. As the Initial Questionnaires make clear,
many former slaves cannot even identify the name of the corporation for
which they labored; they know only what they did, where they did it, and the
generally sub-human conditions in which they were forced to do so.
PLAN OF ALLOCATION [hereinafter PLAN], at 14748 (footnote omitted). The proposed
Plan of Allocation and Distribution ("Plan") is available at http://
www.swissbankclaims.com. The Plan is also published at 25 Fordham Int'l L.J. -
(2001). Page number references in this Essay are to the version available on the In-
ternet.
37. Individuals applying as Slave Labor II claimants-those claiming to have per-
formed slave labor for a Swiss-run company-could receive payment even if they did
not fit one of the VTNP categories. For example, a non-Jewish Pole or Russian would
be eligible, but only if the claimant could show that he or she performed labor for such
a Swiss company.
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was alive on February 15, 1999, but subsequently died, the dece-
dent's heirs could collect the payment.38
For the looted claims, Gribetz took another tack. Conclud-
ing that every VTNP claimant must have had some assets stolen
from them by the Nazis, and the impossibility of tracing such
assets or proceeds to benefits earned by the Swiss banks from the
Nazi-stolen loot, the proposed Plan of Allocation and Distribu-
tion ("Plan") simply excluded payment to claimants seeking in-
dividual compensation for looted assets.3 9 Rather, Gribetz allo-
cated U.S.$100 million to this category, which would then be dis-
bursed through existing charity programs to needy VTNP
survivors. Most of the funds went to aid elderly Jewish survivors
in the former Soviet Union. They were so-called "double vic-
tims," since they were excluded from prior German reparations
programs while living behind the Iron Curtain40 and were now
in dire need in the aftermath of the economic collapse of the
post-Soviet republics.
38. The date chosen was linked to the date of the comprehensive German Founda-
tion settlement. In that settlement, only heirs of former German slave laborers who
were alive on February 15, 1999 could receive a payout owed to their deceased relative.
See PLAN, supra note 36, at 18 n.32.
39. As Gribetz explained:
"There is scarcely a victim of the Nazis who was not looted, and on nearly an
incomprehensible scale .... Plundered loot took a variety of paths once it had
been seized .... With only limited exceptions, however, the current historical
record simply does not permit precise documentations even as to the material
losses in total, much less the nature and value of the loot traceable to Switzer-
land or to Swiss entities.... It is neither justifiable nor appropriate to select
which looting victims may be entitled to recompense from this U.S.$1.25 bil-
lion Settlement Fund based entirely upon the happenstance of where the Nazi
Regime chose to direct which loot, which records of the plunder happen to
survive, and which items one may hazard a guess may have found their way to
or through Switzerland .... The Special Master has considered, but rejected,
two options for allocation and distribution to the Looted Assets Class: the use
of a claims resolution facility to determine individual claims on a case-by-case
basis, or, alternatively any equal pro rata distribution to each claimant. Each of
these options would deplete the Settlement Fund with little, if any noticeable
benefits to class members.... Under these circumstances, the Special Master
believes that one cy pres remedy to benefit the entire class and a second cy pres
program targeting the neediest elderly members of the class should be ap-
plied."
PLAN, supra note 36, at 111-15.
40. These individuals surely fit within the category of victims of looted assets, since
their properties or other belongings were stolen by the Nazis or the local population in
the aftermath of the Nazi occupation. For a discussion of the "double victims," see
PLAN, supra note 36, at 122-30 (Section III, B 4(a)(i)).
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Still living refugees who were denied entry into, or expelled
from, Switzerland during wartime were allocated U.S.$2,500 per
person. This group was small, totaling no more than a few thou-
sand. Each such refugee claimant could eventually receive a
greater amount.
On November 21, 2000, Judge Korman held a second court
hearing, this time to obtain reactions to Gribetz's allocation
plan.
The Israeli daily Ha'aretz reported that the hearing
turned into an ugly verbal battle between Jewish survivors,
representatives of Jewish organizations, and others. Claim-
ants testifying were frequently interrupted by angry shouts
from Holocaust survivors in the packed Brooklyn courtroom.
Many survivors were angry at the various organizations plead-
ing their case for a share of the funds, saying they feared the
money would benefit organizations rather than individuals. 4
Some Jewish survivors were angry that non-Jewish survivors
would participate in the settlement. The eligible non-Jewish sur-
vivors, in turn, argued that they should be receiving a larger
share of the settlement. The non-eligible, non-Jewish survivors
(those excluded from the VTNP categories) argued that they
also should be included in the settlement. Non-eligible heirs ar-
gued that they should be allowed to assert the claims of their
deceased relatives. A senior World Jewish Congress ("WJC") offi-
cial labeled the hearing "a most unfortunate experience. Every-
one involved showed an insensitivity that deserves to be con-
demned. 4 2
41. Angry Wrangling Mars Hearing on Swiss Holocaust Payments, -A'ARETZ, Nov. 22,
2000. Both Neuborne and Gribetz disagree with this characterization. According to
Neuborne:
My recollection of the ... hearing on the Gribetz plan is not nearly as negative
as you depict. There were clashes over how the money should be distributed.
But, given the passion that infuses the issue, I remain proud of the behavior of
the survivor community. The allocation process was difficult, but fundamen-
tally civil.
Email memo from Burt Neuborne to author (Nov. 27, 2001) para. 3, at 2 (on file with
author). Gribetz agrees. I was not present at the hearing, and so must rely on descrip-
tions made by those who were there. Gribetz also points out that "it is telling that while
some 580,000 Initial Questionnaires were filed, only six appeals were filed against the
order approving the Distribution Plan. Each of these six appeals either was withdrawn
or was rejected by the Second Circuit in its July 26, 2001 decision." Letter from Judah
Gribetz and Shari C. Reig to author (Dec. 19, 2001), at 3 (on file with author).
42. Angry Wrangling Mars Hearing, supra note 41.
2001] www.swissbankclaims.com S-81
Korman rejected all objections or proposed modifications.
In November, 2000, he approved Gribetz's Plan of Allocation
and Distribution in full.
With an allocation scheme in place, the next step was to
begin the claims process and, when that was completed, to begin
the actual distribution of the funds. Unfortunately, more delays
arose.
The Swiss banks refused to issue a complete list of possible
dormant accounts. The Volcker audit of the Swiss banks deter-
mined that 53,886 accounts from fifty-nine Swiss banks could
have belonged to victims of Nazi persecution, with 21,000 "prob-
ably" so linked. Volcker's report urged that the names of all
these account holders be published.13  Judge Korman con-
curred.44 He also severely chastised the Swiss banks for their
43. "Volcker initially wanted Swiss banks to create a database with 4.1 million ac-
counts. This would have allowed research not only into accounts with names of victims
but also of names of intermediaries, such as Swiss lawyers, who deposited money for
their clients." Elizabeth Olson, Swiss to List Bank Accounts Unclaimed since Holocaust, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2000, at A28. See also PLAN, supra note 36, at 58-59 (setting out Volcker's
recommendations regarding the identification and publication of dormant accounts,
presented by Volcker to the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, Feb-
ruary 9, 2000).
American Jewish groups urged the broader database, even when the account had
only fragmentary information, with the hope that more account holders could be iden-
tified.
"But the March [2000] agreement by Swiss regulators [to waive Swiss bank secrecy
rules] allowed the publication of the accounts most likely related to Holocaust victims."
Elizabeth Olson, Internet Site to Publish Holocaust-Era Accounts, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTI-
NEL, Nov. 26, 2000, at 31A, available at 2000 WL 28995897.
44. Even the figure issued by the Volcker Committee (53,886 accounts) is probably
underestimated. As the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz pointed out, the Committee auditors
were "able to examine only 4 million out of a total of 6.7 million accounts in Swiss
banks at the end of the war. Details of the remaining accounts were not kept." Yair
Sheleg, Israel: Volcker Panel Numbers Too Low, HA'ARETZ, Dec. 7, 1999. The auditors then
matched the names of holders of the discovered dormant accounts to lists of those who
perished in the Holocaust kept by the U.S. Holocaust Museum and the Yad Vashem
Holocaust Center in Israel. Both these victims' lists, however, are incomplete. For ex-
ample, "the list of victims maintained by Yad Vashem includes only about half of all
those who died in the Holocaust." Id.
As Judge Korman explained, "[t]he bottom line of this is that the 54,000 matched
accounts that were identified as "probably" or "possibly" belonging to victims of Nazi
persecution is based on an audit of approximately one-third of the accounts opened in
Switzerland during the relevant period." In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105
F. Supp. 2d 139, 155 (E.D.N.Y 2000).
While the Volcker Committee report cleared the Swiss banks of any criminal
wrongdoing, the actions of the banks "led the Committee to question whether their
duty of due care in their dealings with customers was observed by a number of banks
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lack of cooperation, and especially the non-defendant Swiss can-
tonal and private banks, which wanted to be included in the set-
tlement, but without having to reveal information about their
dormant wartime accounts.
4 5
and their officers in the special situations following World War II." INDEPENDENT COM-
MITTEE OF EMINENT PERSONS, REPORT OF DORMAT AccouNTs OF VICrIMs OF NAZI PERSE-
CUTION IN Swiss BANKS, Dec. 6, 1999, at 14, available at http://www.icep-iaep.org/fi-
nal-report/.
In a section entitled "Concluding Comment," that report summarized its findings:
The record is clear, certainly by today's standards, that the handling of these
funds was too often grossly insensitive to the special conditions of the Holo-
caust and sometimes misleading in intent and unfair in result. Our inquiry is
one reflection of a willingness by Switzerland to deal with that heritage more
forcefully and openly.
Id. at 23.
45. On March 30, 2000, after an inordinately long and unexplained delay of
four months following the publication of the Volcker Report, the Swiss Fed-
eral Banking Commission ("SFBC") authorized publication of relevant infor-
mation relating to approximately 26,000 of the accounts referred to in the
Volcker Report that were identified as having a 'probable' link to Holocaust
victims [citation omitted]. No authorization was given by the SFBC for the
publication of information relating to the approximately 28,000 remaining ac-
counts identified in the Volcker Report as "possibly" related to Holocaust vic-
ims. Moreover, unlike earlier SFBC rulings concerning publication of infor-
mation relevant to Holocaust-related accounts, the SFBC merely "authorized"
publication of much of the relevant information, but did not mandate com-
plete publication. Perhaps even more disturbing was the failure of the SFBC
to mandate the creation of a central database of 4.1 million accounts that were
opened in Switzerland between 1933-45. In sum, the SFBC, by its actions, has
made it much more difficult to carry out the mandate of the Volcker Commit-
tee that 'victims who have been long denied justice by circumstances beyond
their control-often poor and now aged-deserve every reasonable assistance
in establishing a claim.' [quoting Volcker Report, para. 70] ... The unwilling-
ness of the SFBC to mandate compliance with the recommendations of the
Volcker Committee is inexplicable... It also amounts to nothing less than a
replay of the conduct that created the problems addressed in this case.
Holocaust Victim Assets, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 155-57.
Turning to the behavior of the non-defendant cantonal and private banks, which
wanted to be included in the settlement, Judge Korman explained:
It is disturbing, to say the least, that, having participated in creating the prob-
lem that the Volcker Committee was attempting to address, the Swiss private
and cantonal banks do not feel a moral obligation to the victims of Nazi perse-
cution. Nevertheless, if they seek the benefit of releases under the Settlement
Agreement, these banks cannot legally continue to conceal from the class in-
formation needed to take advantage of the benefits conferred by the Settle-
ment Agreement .... In sum, my hope is that the Swiss Confederation, if not
the SFBC, will take the steps necessary to compel the cantonal and private
banks to comply with the Volcker Committee's recommendations to the same
extent as the defendant banks have agreed to comply.
Id. at 158.
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The banks' position was untenable. Without a full disclo-
sure of all suspected dormant accounts, potential heirs would
never know whether monies belonging to them may be sitting in
a Swiss bank. Only with the publication of a complete list of
names could someone believing that they may be entitled to dor-
mant account monies determine whether a deceased relative in
fact opened an account with the Swiss banks. Previous experi-
ence already bore this out. In 1997, when the Swiss Bankers As-
sociation published two lists of pre-war dormant accounts, Made-
line Kunin, U.S. Ambassador to Switzerland, discovered her
mother's name on the list. Secretary of State Madeline Albright
likewise found out that her Czech grandparents, who perished in
the Holocaust, opened a Swiss bank account prior to the war.
Unfortunately, there was no leverage to apply against the
banks. In February 2001, after some hard-fought negotiations,
the Swiss banks agreed to publish only the names of the 21,000
probable account holders, in addition to the two lists of names
of dormant account holders published in 1997. As a compro-
mise, a person could still make a claim even if his or her name
was not on the list, and such a claim would be investigated.
46
To process the dormant account claims under the settle-
ment, Judge Korman brought onboard the Zurich-based Claims
Resolution Tribunal ("CRT"), created in 1997 by the Swiss Bank-
ers Association ("SBA") and led by Paul Volcker, to process the
claims stemming from the banks' publication of their initial two
lists. Judge Korman formally made the CRT part of the court
settlement process by appointing Volcker and Michael Bradfield,
his chief legal counsel, as Special Masters for the resolution of
the dormant account claims.47
Disputes about disclosure arose also with regard to the class
of claimants entitled to compensation for having worked for
46. A description of the process that will be conducted if such a request is made is
found in Exhibit 1 to the Plan of Allocation, entitled "Memorandum to the File," dated
August 9, 2000, para. 3, negotiated by the parties as a supplement to the Settlement
Agreement and executed by attorneys for both sides. The process appears both convo-
luted and vague, making it extremely unlikely that a lost wartime bank account not
appearing on the official list released by the Swiss banks would ever be found.
47. Since the CRT had been transformed into a court-sanctioned body, it is now
called CRT II, with CRT I being the tribunal created by the Swiss Bankers Association
("SBA") in 1997 to process the claims submitted in response to the SBA's original publi-
cation that year of the two lists of dormant account names. The website for CRT II is
available at http://www.dormantaccounts.ch or http://www.crt-ii.org.
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Swiss-owned or controlled companies which may have used slave
labor. Swiss companies did not employ slave labor in Switzer-
land during the war. However, many Swiss companies had
branches in Germany or Nazi-occupied Europe, and were sus-
pected of having used slave laborers. The Swiss bank defendants
insisted on having such companies included in the settlement
release, but neither the banks, the Swiss government, nor the
Swiss companies themselves wanted to reveal the identity of such
companies. Judge Korman balked, insisting that if a Swiss com-
pany wanted to be released from such slave labor claims it must
come forth and reveal itself. Moreover, the identity of such Swiss
companies was critical to identifying potential claimants, since
former slaves of such companies might not know that the com-
pany they toiled for in wartime Germany or Nazi-occupied Eu-
rope was Swiss-owned.4 8 The Swiss objected to full disclosure
48. As already noted, the class of claimants to this slave labor class (Slave Labor II)
was not limited to VTNPs, but could be any World War II survivor. Holocaust Victim
Assets, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 161 ("The membership of Slave Labor Class II, unlike the
other classes, is not limited to victims of Nazi persecution who were Jewish, Romani,
Jehovah's Witnesses, homosexual, or physically handicapped"). In a supplemental or-
der of December 8, 2000, Judge Korman ordered those companies which have identi-
fied themselves as possibly using slave labor during World War II and seeking to be
included in the Swiss banks settlement to "notify the Special Master as to whether they
possess the names of former slave laborers and, if so, to provide such names to the
Special Master." As Judge Korman explains in a subsequent order of April 4, 2001,
charting the painful process of getting the Swiss to disclose such information:
Several companies responded to this Order, among them Georg Fischer and
Nestle, each of which helpfully provided lists of thousands of individuals who
worked for those companies (and their affiliates) during the War era, many of
whom may have performed slave labor. Other companies updated their re-
search reports and promised to supplement the data as information becomes
available. Many companies also offered to assist in identifying former laborers
as part of the claims process....
Order of Apr. 4, 2001, at 3. The Swiss also wanted the settlement to release Swiss com-
panies which were German- and Austrian-owned prior to the war but acquired by the
Swiss after the war. Judge Korman refused. Id. at 7 ("In sum, slave-labor using compa-
nies acquired by Swiss entities after 1945 plainly are excluded as 'releasees' under the
Settlement Agreement"). The Swiss are now appealing that ruling.
Why so much effort spent on this class? Judge Korman explains: "When this class
was included in the Settlement Agreement, the defendant banks represented that Slave
Labor Class II consists of an extremely small number of Swiss companies during World
War II. Since then, they have backed off this representation." Holocaust Victim Assets,
105 F. Supp. 2d at 162. Besides Nestle, other name-plate Swiss companies identifying
themselves to Gribetz as possibly employing slave labor during World War II include
Ciba-Geigy, Clariant (a spin-off from Sandoz), Novartis, and Roche. Exhibit 1 to Annex
I of Gribetz's Plan lists companies which had self-identified in response to Judge Kor-
man's order.
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and threatened to scuttle the settlement if forced to reveal the
information. 49  They reluctantly offered a partial list of such
Swiss companies, in response to Judge Korman'sJuly, 2000 direc-
tive that:
those Swiss entities that seek releases from Slave Labor Class
II are directed to identify themselves to the Special Master
within 30 days .... The failure of Swiss entities seeking re-
leases from Slave Labor Class II claims to identify themselves
will result in the denial of a release and permit those who
have claims against those entities to pursue such claims inde-
pendently of this lawsuit.50
Along with partial information about Swiss companies
which employed slave laborers, the Swiss issued another partial
list of refugees expelled from, or denied entry into, Switzerland
during the war.
In mid-April 2001, five months after Korman approved
Gribetz's plan, the claims process for the Swiss settlement for-
mally began. Unfortunately, claimants in all categories were re-
quired to complete another form to formally apply for funds,
even if they earlier had completed the June 1999-issued "Initial
Questionnaire."
In July 2001, five years after the start of the litigation against
the Swiss banks and close to three years after the settlement was
49. See Holocaust Victim Assets, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 163-67 (Section entitled "The
Defendant Banks' Threat to Repudiate the Amendments to the Settlement Agree-
ment").
50. Id. at 162. Gribetz describes the consequences of Judge Korman's order:
"Within the thirty-day period fixed by the Court, the Special Master received
correspondence from thirty seven Swiss entities, seeking releases for them-
selves and for hundreds of their subsidiary companies. The companies writing
to the Special Master included small businesses bankrupted after the War as
well as some of the largest industrial conglomerates in Switzerland, and they
range across many disparate industries, including, prominently, firms manu-
facturing pharmaceuticals, aluminum and armaments, among other
things .... In addition to the corporate self-examinations discussed above,
Chief Judge Korman's directive appears to have prompted additional public
discussion of the employment by Swiss firms of forced laborers. On August 24,
2000, the National Swiss Press Agency released a news report entitled 'Firms
with Swiss Capital and Forced Labor in Germany,' written by its Head of Opera-
tions, Roderick von Kauffungen .... Based on the evidence von Kauffungen
uncovered, the National Swiss Press Agency estimated that 'firms in Germany
with Swiss capital employed over 11,000 forced laborers,' adding that '[i]t
must nevertheless be assumed that the actual numbers are greater.'
PLAN, supra note 36, Annex I, at 3, 6 (footnote omitted).
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joyously announced at the Brooklyn federal courthouse, pay-
ments of approximately U.S.$1,000 finally began to dribble in to
aging survivors.51 By then, all involved had been thoroughly ex-
hausted by the ordeal.5 2
Il. "THE MOTHER OF ALL HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION
SETTLEMENTS" THE LEGALITY AMD MORALITY
OF THE SWISS BANKS SETTLEMENT
The Swiss banks settlement produced an enormous impact
upon both (1) the entire Holocaust restitution process and (2)
claims for other historical wrongs.
The Holocaust restitution campaign began in 1995 and fo-
cused exclusively on the Swiss banks. The goals then were mod-
est: to ferret out the monies deposited primarily by European
Jews with the Swiss banks in the pre-war era for safekeeping, and
to return the monies to the rightful heirs. Six years later, the
results achieved were astounding. Not only did the Swiss banks
agree to pay U.S.$1.25 billion, but, overall, more than U.S.$8 bil-
lion had been pledged for Holocaust restitution payments. The
payers included European multinationals, numerous European
51. Swiss Sends First Direct Payments to Holocaust Survivors, AGENCE FRANcE-PRESSE,
Aug. 3, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24983540. As for the slave labor claimants receiving
only U.S.$1,000, Professor Neuborne explains:
I share your concern over the limited recoveries going to Jewish slave laborers.
Of course the amount is too low. But, to be fair, you should note that the
$1,000 figure was chosen because the German Foundation will provide an ad-
ditional $7,500 to each slave laborer, and that additional distributions are
highly likely if the bank account fund is not fully exhausted. [Paragraph] It is
also unfair to characterize the Swiss recovery as $1,000 per survivor, when
many thousands of bank account recoveries will be far greater. I believe that
an award of more than than $1 million has already been made, and we expect
several large recoveries.
Email memo from Burt Neuborne to author (Nov. 27, 2001) para. 4, at 2 (on file with
author).
52. Of course, those who could prove a right to a dormant Swiss bank account
(i.e., the "deposited assets" claimants) received payouts of much higher amounts. As of
November 1, 2001, 24 awards have been issued by the court-supervised Claims Resolu-
tion Tribunal (CRT-II) to such claimants, totaling over $3.4 million. One of the awards
was over U.S.$1 million. An updated list of the Claims Resolution Tribunal's awards
can be located at the Tribunal's website, specifically at www.crt-ii-org/_awards/in-
dex.phtm. Additionally, the original Claims Resolution Tribunal created by the Swiss
Bankers Association in 1997 (CRT-I), which was then conflated into CRT-II, paid SF16
million (U.S.$10 million) to Holocaust victims' heirs by the time it finished its work on
September 30, 2001, which it distributed to 3,121 successful claimants. See http://
www.crt.ch/statistics.html.
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governments, and even American corporations and the U.S. gov-
ernment.
When the first lawsuits were filed against the Swiss banks in
1996, it would have been unthinkable that this would be the end
result of the litigation.
This remains the most important legacy of the Swiss banks
litigation. Not only did the litigation yield an over U.S.$1 billion
settlement payout from the Swiss banks, but also opened the
floodgates for all the Holocaust restitution settlements to follow.
Surely, if the campaign against the Swiss had failed, the Holo-
caust restitution movement would have gone nowhere. Success
against the Swiss banks emboldened lawyers, politicians, andJew-
ish activists in the United States to take on other corporations
which had profited from the miseries of the Holocaust victims.
In a very real sense, therefore, the Swiss banks settlement can be
called the mother of all Holocaust restitution settlements, yield-
ing not only the U.S.$1.25 billion from the Swiss banks, but also
leading to an additional U.S.$7 billion being called for other res-
titution claims.5"
One example-one which would have been totally unthink-
able in 1995-illustrates this point well. The initial accusations
that the Swiss banks failed to return monies deposited with them
for safekeeping by Holocaust victims led to inquiries about
whether banks in other countries might also be holding such
pre-war and wartime dormant accounts. One surprising answer:
Israel.
In the 1930's, thousands of European Jews opened accounts
at the Anglo-Palestine Bank in British Palestine. These accounts
typically contained 1,000 British pounds (approximately
U.S.$1,500), the amount required to be eligible to receive an
entry permit into British Mandate Palestine. As World War II
53. In addition to forcing European and American corporations to pay restitution
for their wartime activities, the Swiss settlement also led museums throughout the world
to confront the fact that they had in their collections art stolen by the Nazis. See
Bazyler, supra note 1, at 161-89. As explained by Elan Steinberg, executive director of
the World Jewish Congress in New York and one of the top negotiators in the Holocaust
restitution arena, "[u]ntil the Swiss bank scandal, frankly, museums were indifferent on
this issue." Michael Ollove, Museums Tracing Nazi-Looted Art, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZE'IE,
Apr. 18, 2000, at A4, available at 2000 WL 10896235. To the additional U.S.$7 billion
collected in the aftermath of the Swiss settlement, there must be added the value of the
various pieces of Nazi-stolen art, numbering in the tens of millions of dollars, returned
to their rightful owners.
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unfolded, Great Britain classified these deposits as belonging to
enemy aliens, since the European Jewish depositors came from
Germany, Austria, and eventually, nations conquered by Nazi
Germany. The fate of these deposits remained a mystery for
over a half century-until the onset of the campaign against the
Swiss banks. In January 2000, Bank Leumi, Israel's largest bank
and the Anglo-Palestine Bank's successor, admitted to holding
approximately 13,000 dormant accounts, many of which are be-
lieved to have belonged to victims of Nazi persecution. Like the
Swiss banks, Bank Leumi initially refuted the accusations that it
might be holding such funds. This led to Bank Leumi being
accused of being no better than the Swiss banks. Bank Leumi
soon gave up the fight. Embarrassed into following the model
adopted by the Swiss banks and other European corporations, it
created a claims settlement process by which survivors and heirs
entitled to these funds would be eligible to receive them.5 4
The Bank Leumi episode illustrates an important legacy of
the Swiss campaign. Restitution claims made by Holocaust survi-
vors-or for that matter any other historical claims for financial
54. Information about Bank Leumi's Holocaust-era dormant accounts and claims
process can be located at http://www.unclaimedassets.com/israel.html. For discussion
of Israeli companies and the Israeli government's efforts at Holocaust restitution, see
Allyn Fisher-Ilan, Israel's Unfinished Holocaust Business, JERUSALEM Posr, Jan. 21, 2000, at
7B, available at 2000 WL 8252339; Jack Katzenell, Writer: Israel Has WWII Assets, AP
ONLINE, Apr. 13, 2000, available at 2000 WL 19049913 (discussing publication of treatise
in Israel, Forgotten Property by Israeli professor Yossi Katz, regarding "land, houses, and
other assets in what was then British Mandatory Palestine [ ] purchased by European
Jews, many of whom later died in the Holocaust"); Nina Gilbert, Panel to Probe Holocaust-
era Assets, JERUSALEM REPORT, Apr. 20, 2001, at 5A, available at 2001 WL 6606176.
In 1999, the Israel Museum in Jerusalem, Israel's premier art institution, was dis-
covered to be holding a Pisarro painting stolen by the Nazis from its Jewish owners.
The Pisarro made its way into the post-war New York art market, where it was purchased
by an American couple, who then donated it to the Israel Museum. The museum had
been displaying the painting since 1997. After some wrangling (see Israel Museum Drags
Its Feet Over Its Looted Pisarro, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 2, 1999, at 4, available at 1999 WL
9688061), the elderly heir of the pre-war owners (now living in Great Britain) and the
Israel Museum reached an agreement allowing the museum to display the painting on a
long-term loan. See Rebecca Trounson, After Circuitous Journey, Painting Lost to Nazis
Finds a Home in Israel, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2000, at A6.
In November, 2001, an Israeli parliamentary commission concluded that the total
value of unclaimed Holocaust-era assets held by Israeli banks, the Israeli State and vari-
ous Israeli public institutions amounted to approximately 25 billion shekels, or
U.S.$6.25 billion, a much larger figure than previously believed. Most of this was land
purchased by European Jews in pre-war mandate Palestine. When these individuals
perished, the land remained unclaimed. Edgar Lefkowitz, Dormant Holocaust-Era Assets
Valued at NIS 25b, JERUSALEM PosT, Nov. 9, 2001.
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wrongs-can no longer be ignored by those accused of benefit-
ing from those wrongs. Such accusations are now taken seri-
ously.
The Swiss campaign also made other important contribu-
tions. In the face of allegations being made against them, the
Swiss banks and the Swiss government created, respectively, the
Volcker Committee and the Bergier Commission to ferret out
the truth about Switzerland's financial shenanigans during
World War II. The Swiss model is now the prototype used by
both other European governments and private corporations
when confronted with accusations about their wartime role. Af-
ter a half-century of silence, the full historical record is only now
coming out about how German, Austrian, French, British and
even American companies profited from the Holocaust. The
historical black hole of how commerce was conducted in Europe
between 1933-45 is finally being filled in by Holocaust historians
who, as the New York Times 5 reported, are now much in demand
to staff the historical commissions being created by governments
and private companies to research and issue reports about their
financial dealings with the Nazis. 56 All of this is being done in
55. Barry Meier, Historians are in Demand to Study Corporate Ties to Nazis, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 18, 1999, at Cl. See also Dan Glaister, Shadow of Shame, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 22,
1998, at 2, available at 1998 WL 24896170:
The words "independent critical review" have become a mantra for German
companies attempting to cope with the past. Giant industrial concerns such as
Flick, Krupp, IG Farben, Volkswagen and Daimler-Benz have all commissioned
"independent critical reviews" of their records in the Nazi period. Construc-
tive self-criticism has in itself become something of a growth industry in Ger-
many, with bodies such as the Society for Business History and the Institute for
Bank Historical Research springing up to help companies come to terms with
their past.
Id.
56. In 1998, Deutsche Bank, which had been accused of profiting in their close
dealings with the Nazis and which had been sued in U.S. courts over such dealings,
hired five outside historians to examine its role during the Nazi era. To date, two of the
historians from its "Historical Commission Appointed to Examine the History of the
Deutsche Bank in the Period of National Socialism" have issued their findings: one on
Deutsche Bank's collusion with the Nazi regime in the theft of gold looted from both
occupied nations and victims (JONATHAN STEINBERG, THE DEUTSCHE BANK AND ITS GOLD
TRANSACTIONS DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1999)); and the second on the role of
Deutsche Bank in the expropriation of Jewish-owned assets in Nazi Germany (HAROLD
JAMES, THE DEUTSCHE BANK AND THE NAZI ECONOMIC WAR AGAINST THE JEWS (2001)).
Allianz, Germany's largest insurance company and owner of the Fireman's Fund
Insurance Company in the United States, commissioned Professor Gerald Feldman of
U.C. Berkeley to investigate its dealings with the Nazis. Professor Feldman published
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the aftermath, and as a consequence, of the Swiss campaign.
Sec ond, the Swiss campaign showed the enormous power
that sanctions, or more precisely, the mere threat of sanctions
can play in influencing the behavior of foreign corporations that
do business in the United States. As important as the lawsuits
against the Swiss banks in getting the Swiss banks to the bargain-
ing table was the regime of rolling sanctions instituted against
the banks by New York City Comptroller Alan Hevesi's Executive
Monitoring Committee." The threats by Hevesi and his finan-
cial officer counterparts in other cities and states throughout the
his report in the latter half of 2001. See GERALD D. FELDMAN, ALLIANZ AND THE GERMAN
INSURANCE BUSINESS, 1933-1945 (2001).
Bertelsmann, Germany's leading publisher, the biggest publisher in the English
language and owner of U.S. publisher Random House, hired famed Holocaust histo-
rian Saul Friedlander of UCLA to research its wartime history, after it was revealed "that
Bertelsmann did some very despicable things, not only publishing books for the Ger-
man Army and the SS, but also publishing some very anti-Semitic works." Glaister,
supra note 55 (quotingJohn Friedman). Professor Friedlander is scheduled to issue his
findings in 2002.
In 1998-99, American automakers Ford and General Motors became the first Amer-
ican companies to allow historians to examine their wartime records for possible com-
plicity with the Nazis.
In 1998, Ford Motor Company began an in-house study of the wartime role of Ford
Werke, Ford's German subsidiary, which exploited the vast pool of slave labor that the
Nazis made available to German private industry during the war. See Bazyler, supra note
1, at 203-206. The study was reviewed by Lawrence Dowler, a former archivist and libra-
rian at Harvard and Yale universities, and Simon Reich, a University of Pittsburgh politi-
cal scientist. In December, 2001, Ford released the study, which concluded that the
parent company did not profit from its German subsidiary's operations in Nazi Ger-
many. Concurrent with the study's release, Ford announced that it would be "donating
the documents for this project, along with a searchable database, to the Benson Ford
Research Center at Henry Ford Museum & Greenfield Village, where they will be availa-
ble for research [by the public]." Press Release, Ford Issues Report on Ford-Werke
Under the Nazi Regime, (Dec. 6, 2001), available at http://media.ford.com/news
room/release-display-test.cfm? articleid= 10374 &id=77&artids=10550,10543,10542,
10540,10685,10481,10374,10375,10376,10377&sec=77. See also Henry Weinstein, Ford
Says WWII Study Clears Firm, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at Al. "Ford, the world's second-
largest auto maker, also said it will donate $4 million toward human rights studies,
primarily focusing on slave and forced labor." Id.
In 1999, General Motors hired Yale University historian Henry Turner to identify,
collect and catalog documents relevant to the role of its German subsidiary, Adam Opel
AG, during the Third Reich. The documents will soon be deposited at the Yale Li-
brary's Manuscripts and Archives Collections for use by researchers, and Professor Tur-
ner is presently writing a book on the subject. Email from H.A. Turner to author (Nov.
22, 2001) (on file with author).
57. For discussion of the involvement of Alan Hevesi and other state and local
officials in the Swiss banks litigation, including the creation of the Executive Monitor-
ing Committee, see Bazyler, supra note 1, at 65-68.
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United States to stop doing business with the Swiss banks unless
they settle the lawsuits against them were critical to the banks'
capitulation. Hevesi's success also demonstrated that Stuart
Eizenstat, the Clinton Administration's "point man" on the Hol-
ocaust restitution issues, who was urging on behalf of the federal
government that talk of sanctions be dropped lest it lead to a
trade war with Switzerland, was wrong.5 8 Sanctions and boycotts,
and their threats, were not counter-productive to getting Euro-
pean multinationals to settle the wartime claims against them.
Rather, the "one-two punch" of the American lawyers first filing
the class action lawsuits against the European defendants, and
American officials at the state and local levels then threatening
to cut out the defendants from profitable U.S. deals unless they
come to the bargaining table to settle the suits, was the perfect
strategy to resolve the claims. The strategy was repeated, and
worked perfectly time and again, against succeeding claims
made against the German, Austrian, French, and Dutch defend-
ants. To the displeasure of Eizenstat, Hevesi became an impor-
tant-but unwelcome-partner in the federal government's ef-
forts to have the other European defendants follow the Swiss
banks' example in resolving Holocaust-era claims against them.
An announcement by Hevesi that his Executive Monitoring
Committee would be holding a hearing to determine why a cer-
tain Holocaust-era claim was not being resolved would often be
the only push needed to have a recalcitrant defendant come for-
ward with a new proposal to conclude the matter.5 9
58. Eizenstat held a number of posts during the Clinton Administration, working
on issues ranging from the environment to international finance. Nevertheless, he
credits his most important accomplishment as having "brought back the unfinished
business of World War II and the Holocaust to the public's eye, of doing some measure
ofjustice to the elderly survivors, and creating a greater sense of memory for those who
perished." Sharon Samber, A Priceless Effort, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 5, 2001, at 7B, availa-
bLe at 2001 WrL 6600727. Despite getting it wrong on the sanctions issue, Eizenstat
should be credited with being the prime mover in the U.S. government of the Holo-
caust restitution movement. He is one of the heroes of this movement.
59. For example, one day before the Executive Committee's meeting to discuss the
issue, Austrian and U.S. negotiators in January 2001, agreed to a deal by Austria to
compensate Holocaust survivors. Sometimes, Hevesi would resort to bluffing. Thus, in
1998, he announced that the Executive Monitoring Committee would examine the pro-
posed purchase by Deutsche Bank of New York-based Banker's Trust, in light of
Deutsche Bank's failure to resolve its Holocaust-era claims. Even though New York had
no authority to review this purchase-a matter wholly within the province of the U.S.
Federal Reserve Board-Hevesi's rumblings led Deutsche Bank to renew its efforts to
settle the claims.
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Finally, there is the significant impact of the Swiss banks liti-
gation upon American law. On first blush, it appears that the
lawsuits filed against the Swiss banks could not be handled by
U.S. courts. The activities in question occurred in Europe, not
in the United States. The parties sued were foreign corpora-
tions. Many of the plaintiffs also were foreigners. And the acts
complained of originated over a half century ago. With such
facts, the Swiss banks suits appeared to many as one of those
hopeless lawsuits filed more for publicity purposes than for any
hope for success. The actual course of the litigation showed oth-
erwise.
An important reason why the Swiss banks litigation was
taken seriously both by the Swiss bank defendants and Judge
Korman, despite the above-mentioned factors, was the victory
achieved by the human rights bar over the last two decades in
convincing American courts that human rights victims injured
abroad can sue in the United States. That step began with Filar-
tiga v. Pena-Irala, a landmark decision issued in 1980 by the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals, in New York, holding that the per-
petrator of State-sanctioned torture in Paraguay can be sued in
the United States by the relatives of the deceased torture vic-
tim. 6 0 The court of appeals allowed the case to go forward even
though the torture was committed in Paraguay, and all the par-
ties in the litigation were Paraguayan. In a ringing endorsement
of the principle of universal jurisdiction-that certain human
rights violations are so abhorrent to modern society that its per-
petrators can be brought to justice anywhere in the world-the
court found that "for purposes of civil liability, the torturer [to-
day] has become like the pirate and slave trader before him[:]
hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."6"
For the twenty years preceding the Swiss banks litigation,
various human rights victims injured abroad have come to the
United States to successfully sue their perpetrators under the hos-
tis humani generis principle. These lawsuits included a suit
against former Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos, a suit
against the indicted Serbian criminal Rodovan Karadzic, and va-
60. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Since the Swiss banks law-
suits were filed in the Second Circuit, the Filartiga decision was binding precedent for
any decision issued by Judge Korman.
61. Id. at 890.
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rious other lawsuits against foreign countries, corporations, and
individuals for human rights violations committed abroad.6 2
In 1987, the prestigious American Law Institute, which pub-
lishes summaries of American law in books known as restate-
ments, recognized the hostis humani generis principle as being
part of American law in its latest edition of the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law.6 3 In 1992, Congress also came onboard
by enacting the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"), ex-
tending the right of victims of foreign torture to sue in American
courts to include American torture victims. 64
62. For the foreign defendant to be sued, the courts required the defendants be
present in the United States, even momentarily. Thus, Rodovan Karadzic was served
with court papers when he came to the United States as part of the Serbian delegation
invited to the United States to end the war in Bosnia. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,
237 (2d Cir. 1995). In the mid-1990's, a Guatemalan general was sued and served with
court papers while on a visit to Harvard University. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp.
162, 169 (D. Mass. 1995). It turned out that the general was also a torturer, and was
sued by his victims, both Guatemalan and American, when they learned of his U.S. visit.
In August, 2000, Li Peng, the Premier of China at the time of the Tiananmen protests
and massacre, likewise was served with a lawsuit filed under the hostis humani generis
principle during a visit to the United States. The case is still in litigation.
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 404.
64. In an odd quirk of American law, until the Torture Victim Protection Act
("TVPA") was enacted, only foreigners could sue their hostis humani generis perpetrators;
the TVPA now gives American nationals the same right to sue. The pre-TVPA oddity
existed because the Filartiga court found jurisdiction existing in the Alien Torts Claim
Act ("ATCA"), a federal law enacted by the first U.S. Congress in 1789, giving federal
courts the right to hear suits filed by aliens for torts which amount to violations of "the
Law of Nations," the older term for international law. See 28 U.S.C. §1350. The first
Congress enacted the law as part of its effort to have the former 13 colonies join the
then-existing international community of nations, which recognized the international
law principle that international outlaws can be brought to justice wherever they are
caught. Hence, the Filartiga court's reference likening the modem torturer to the pi-
rate and slave trader of the 19th century, the two most common international outlaws of
that time. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law added three modem outlaws to
the hostis humani generis category: perpetrators of genocide, individuals involved in "at-
tacks on or hijacking of aircraft," and "perhaps certain acts of terrorism." RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 63.
The ATCA was long forgotten until the New York-based Center for Constitutional
Rights resurrected it by filing the Filartiga suit to claim jurisdiction over Pena, the
Paraguayan torturer. The trial court initially would have none of it, dismissing the suit
as falling outside the ATCA. The Second Circuit reversed, finding that jurisdiction was
proper. On remand, the same trial judge, now following the mandate of the court of
appeals, found in favor of the Paraguayan victims and issued a U.S.$10.4 million judg-
ment against Pena. Filartiga, 577 F. Supp. at 860. Unfortunately, by that time Pena was
long gone, having been deported back to Paraguay for overstaying his tourist visa.
Articles on the ATCA are now legion. A good collection is found in THE ALIEN
TORT CLAIMS Acr: AN ANALYrICAL ANTHOLOGY (Ralph G. Steinhardt & Anthony
D'Amato eds., 1999). Critiques of this litigation can be found in Ann-Marie Slaughter
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By the time the Swiss bank cases were filed, therefore, Amer-
ican judges were familiar with suits being presented to them in-
volving acts committed on foreign soil against foreign defend-
ants, and were amenable to finding that U.S. courts possessed
jurisdiction over such suits when the acts complained of com-
prised gross violations of human rights law committed by foreign
defendants who were present in the United States. All that was
necessary was for the lawyers of the Holocaust survivors suing the
Swiss banks to fit their allegations within the existing hostis
humani generis principle. It was not difficult. The Swiss banks
could hardly argue that their acting as active collaborators with
one of the most despised regimes in the history of mankind, and
enriching themselves in the process, did not amount to a gross
violation of human rights law.65 Moreover, here were the same
Swiss banks doing extensive business in New York, the locale
where the suits were filed.
For the dormant account claims, the lawyers relied on a sim-
ple legal principle recognized by all legal systems of the world:
unjust enrichment. Taken from ancient Roman law, the rule of
unjust enrichment requires judges to expunge from the wrong-
doer assets wrongly taken from, or not properly returned to, the
victim. Here, the lawyers alleged that for over fifty years, the
Swiss banks kept monies deposited with them which they were
obliged to return to the depositors or their heirs. Instead, the
lawsuits alleged that the banks wrongfully kept the funds and
invested them over the years to make millions.
The lawyers suing the Swiss banks, however, were not only
the passive recipients of the two-decade precedent done largely
by others.6 6 Rather, as a result of their settlement, they also ex-
& David Bosco, Plaintiffs Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFF. Sept./Oct. (2000) (noting that
Slaughter is a Harvard law professor) and Peter H. Schuck, Benched, WAsH. MONTHLY,
Dec. 1, 2000, at 35, available at 2000 WL 4656842 (noting that the author is a Yale law
professor).
65. In their motions to dismiss, the Swiss banks argued that their activities of being
the bankers for the Nazis amounted to "business as usual." The banks, the Swiss banks'
lawyers argued, were merely performing for Hider and his cohorts financial activities
regularly conducted by international financial institutions: accepting deposits from
abroad, exchanging currency (in this case, Reich deutschmarks not accepted by most
nations into freely convertible Swiss francs), and purchasing gold presented to them for
sale by the Nazi regime. It was a specious argument.
66. Of more than 40 lawyers participating in the Swiss bank lawsuits, only one,
Robert Swift of Philadelphia, had previously been involved in ATCA/TVPA litigation,
having represented one set of victims suing Ferdinand Marcos for torture committed in
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tended hostis humani generis law in the United States.
A major practical problem faced by many of the hostis
humani generis lawsuits was that the plaintiffs, upon receiving a
multi-million judgment in the United States against the defen-
dant perpetrators, were then unable to collect upon the judg-
ment. The defendant did not possess any assets in the United
States which could be executed upon to satisfy the judgment.
Moreover, international law currently has no mechanism for col-
lecting the funds obtained in a U.S. suit in a defendant's home
country.67 The successful plaintiffs in the Filartiga case, for in-
stance, over twenty years after the end of the litigation, still re-
tain only a paper judgment against the torturer defendant Pena.
Similarly, two multi-million dollar judgments against Rodovan
Karadzic remain uncollected.
Plaintiffs and their lawyers in the hostis humani generis litiga-
tion have had to satisfy themselves with a moral victory. At least
the suffering of the foreign victims has been recognized by an
American court, the most prestigious in the world, and the ac-
tions of the perpetrator condemned. The lawyers involved in
the litigation had always hoped, however, that they could win a
case where the money judgment could be collected as well.6 8
the Philippines during the Marcos dictatorship. Swift, like most of the other lawyers
suing the Swiss banks, went on to represent Holocaust survivors or heirs in suits filed
against German corporations for slave labor, European insurance companies for failure
to honor insurance policies, and other corporate defendants for their profit-making
activities arising out of the Holocaust. He is now one of the lawyers suing Japanese
companies for their use of American POWs and Asian civilians as slave labor during
World War II. A number of the other lawyers involved in the Holocaust-era suits also
began filing suits on behalf of the former wartime Japanese slaves in their suits against
the Japanese companies. In the interest of full disclosure, I note that I am assisting in
this litigation. I did not participate in the Holocaust-restitution litigation.
67. Under the international law principle of comity, a foreign court can, but does
not have to, recognize ajudgment obtained in the United States. To remedy this prob-
lem, a draft treaty is now being worked on for nations to recognize each other's court
judgments.
In Filartiga and its progeny, comity does not work, since the nation where the hostis
humani generis violation took place is usually a dictatorship where the perpetrator is
protected rather than prosecuted. Thus, in Filartiga, the father and daughter of the
torture victim came to the United States to pursue Pena, whom they learned, by chance,
was in the United States. They did so only after their efforts to obtain justice in Para-
guay were thwarted by the dictatorial regime for whom Pena worked as a police official.
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 877-79.
68. See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988). In one of the cases,
filed against Argentine Colonel Alfredo Suarez-Mason, responsible for the disappear-
ance of plaintiffs mother during the "dirty war" years of military rule in Argentina in
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The Swiss bank litigation turned out to be that case. The
wealthy Swiss banks had plenty of assets in the United States to
satisfy any judgment issued against them. Hence, another bene-
ficial legacy of the U.S.$1.25 billion settlement with the Swiss.
This time, the hostis humani generis litigation yielded both a
favorable result and actual payment.
Another significant legacy of the Swiss banks litigation (and
the other Holocaust-era restitution suits which followed) was to
extend the hostis humani generis precedent to the corporate
arena. The defendants in the Swiss banks litigation were not
some former dictators or foreign government officials now living
in lonely exile in the United States, nor drop-in foreign dignita-
ries caught in the web of the American justice system while visit-
ing the United States. Rather, these defendants were some of
the most powerful corporations in the world. The Swiss banks,
in direct contrast to the staid and honest image they developed
over the years, were being exposed as Hitler's secret bankers.
Later, German companies also with sterling corporate images,
names like Mercedez-Benz, BMW, VW, Siemens, and Allianz In-
surance, faced similar accusations of being active collaborators
with the Nazis. For the first time, therefore, the Filartiga prece-
dent was being applied to hold corporations responsible for
their activities.
The Swiss banks settlement and the subsequent corporate
lawsuits it fostered are currently being used by legal advocacy
groups seeking to make multinationals into good global citizens.
The first to be sued have been the corporate oil giants.6 9 Mul-
tinationals like Exxon Mobil, Texaco, Royal Dutch/Shell, Chev-
ron, and Unocal are now fighting suits in U.S. courts accusing
them of engaging in human rights and environmental abuses in
foreign countries.7 0 The suit against Unocal, for example, al-
the 1970s, the plaintiffs believed that they found assets in the United States owned by
Suarez-Mason on which they could collect after winning a judgment against him. It
turned, out to be not so.
69. SeeJota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Pe-
troleum, 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D.
Cal. 2000); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., Civ. No. C99-2506 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Doe v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., Civ. No. 1:01CV01357 (D.C. 2001).
70. For a legal analysis of such suits, see Pamela A. Maclean, The Court of Last Resort,
CALIFORNIA LAWYER 36 (Sept. 2001); Margaret G. Perl, Not Just Another Mass Tort: Using
Class Actions to Redress International Human Rights Violations, 88 GEo. L. J. 773 (2000);
Kathryn L. Boyd, Collective Rights Adjudication in U.S. Courts: Enforcing Human Rights at
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leges that the oil company participated with its investment part-
ner, the military dictatorship in Burma, in enslavement and
forced resettlement of the local population in the Burmese
countryside where the joint venture project was being con-
ducted.71 The lawsuit against Exxon Mobil is being pursued by
local Indonesian villagers who contend that they have been vic-
tims of torture, kidnapping, rape, and murder of their relatives,
at the hands of the Indonesian military unit guarding Exxon Mo-
bil's natural gas field.72 The Swiss banks litigation and the other
Holocaust-era cases are being cited as precedent in these suits.
What is different in this latest round of international human
rights law litigation from the Swiss Banks litigation is that these
multinationals are being hauled into American courts for activi-
ties stemming from ongoing investments today rather than for
conduct of years ago. The settlement with the Swiss banks for
long-forgotten but then resurrected conduct remains a powerful
warning to the world's corporate giants: your activities today
may be judged many years in the future.
A final significant legal legacy of the Swiss banks litigation
was to push back the time line for which wrongful acts can be
adjudged by a U.S. court. Until the Swiss banks litigation, legal
dogma held that activities which took place over a half century
ago could not overcome the problem of the limitations period
built-in into every civil action filed in the United States. The
claims were just too old, it was believed, to be litigated now. In
fact, prior to the Swiss banks litigation, civil suits filed over Holo-
caust-era events were dismissed by American courts as being
time-barred.73
the Corporate Level, 1999 B.Y.U.L. REv. 1139 (1999); Sarah H. Cleveland, Global Labor
Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1533 (1998); Hari M. Osofsky, Envi-
ronmental Human Rights Under the Alien Tort Statute: Redress for Indigenous Victims of Mul-
tinational Corporations, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 335 (1997).
71. Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880, 884-85 (C.D. Cal. 1997). In August, 2000, the
trial judge dismissed the lawsuit (Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp.2d 1294 (C.D. Cal.
2000)), and the case is now on appeal.
72. Neela Banerjee, U.S. Lawsuit Snares Exxon, Oil Firm is Cited in Indonesian Human
Rights Abuses, INT'L HERALD TpaB., June 22, 2001, at 19.
73. For example, in the 1980s, a class action lawsuit was filed by plaintiff Handel,
an elderly Holocaust survivor from Yugoslavia, against defendant Artukovic, a former
high-ranking official in the puppet government of Nazi-occupied Croatia. The lawsuit
was dismissed. The trial judge based her dismissal on the ground that the suit was
barred by the California statute of limitations. See Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp.
1421 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
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Here, there was no such dismissal. Despite the claims stem-
ming from events originating in the 1930s and 1940s, the Swiss
banks were paying a significant sum to settle the claims. As a
result of this victory, suits began to be filed against other corpo-
rate defendants for their activities during World War II. And not
only against European companies. Japanese multinationals are
now defending American suits for their use of American POWs
and foreign civilians as slaves during the war.1
4
Other movements-seeing the success of the Swiss banks lit-
igation-tried to push the international human rights litigation
time line back even further. In early 2000, elderly victims of the
Armenian genocide sued New York Life Insurance Company for
failure to honor insurance policies issued to the Armenians at
the beginning of the twentieth century. New York Life offered
to settle for U.S.$15 million.7 5
The African-American reparations movement, seeking pay-
ments from both the U.S. government and private American
companies involved in the slave trade, was given fresh impetus
from the Swiss banks litigation and subsequent Holocaust-era
settlements.7 6 Reparation proponents specifically point to the
74. In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939
(N.D. Cal. 2000), 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (federal court dismisses claims
against Japanese companies for wartime slave labor); Court's Ruling re: Defendants'
Second Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Jeong v. Onoda Cement Co., Ltd., No.
BC 217805 (Cal. Superior Ct., Nov. 29, 2001) (California state court upholds claims
against Japanese companies for wartime slave labor); see also K. Connie Kang, Slave La-
bor Lawsuit Against Japanese Firms to Continue, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2001, at B-4 (article
summarizes suits filed to date). Congress also held hearings on the subject. See Former
U.S. World War II POW's: A Struggle for Justice, Hearing before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 106 Cong 14 (2000). For a discussion of this litigation see Holocaust Restitution in
Comparative Perspective, supra note 2.
75. Nathan Vardi, Settling a Case-After 85 Years, FoRBES, May 14, 2001, at 120. The
lawyers in the Armenian case paid homage to the Swiss banks settlement and other
Holocaust-era lawsuits by citing them as inspiration for their suit. See Beverly Beyette,
He Stands Up in the Name of the Armenians: Attorney's Quest to Collect Insurance for Genocide
Victims' Heirs Starts to Pay Off L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2001, at El. Suits are now being
contemplated against other American insurance companies that sold policies to
Armenians in Ottoman Turkey. Id. For a discussion of this litigation, see Holocaust
Restitution in Comparative Perspective, supra note 2.
76. See Tamar Lewin, Calls for Slavery Restitution Getting Louder, N.Y. TIMES, June 4,
2001, at A15. In an obvious parallel between the two movements, the New York Times, in
trying to explain the growing call for African-American slavery restitution, sought the
comments of Stuart Eizenstat, the U.S. government's chief envoy on Holocaust restitu-
tion issues. Eizenstat was not optimistic.
For slavery qua slavery, I think the appropriate remedy is affirmative govern-
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payments now being made for World War II-era wrongs as prece-
dent for their cause. In the face of accusations that theirs is an
empty gesture with no chance of success, they point out that the
Swiss banks litigation was also viewed by most legal observers as a
"sure loser" when filed in October 1996. Less than two years
later, the Swiss banks were ready to shell out U.S.$1.25 billion to
end the litigation.
Having painted the beneficial consequences of the Swiss
banks litigation, I must concede that not all is positive. In fact,
looking at the amounts obtained from the claims made against
the Swiss banks, it may appear on first blush that the process was
a failure. After six years of hard work, most elderly survivors re-
ceived only a token sum of U.S.$1,000." For this sum, they were
made to dredge out once again their painful wartime horrors-
ment action in general, rather than reparations .... And if 100 years from
now the great-great-grandson of a Holocaust laborer asked for reparations, I
don't think that would be appropriate, unless there was some specific property
that had been confiscated that they wanted to recover.
Id. The New York Times came late into the picture. By the time of the Times story, every
other major U.S. newspaper and all national TV networks had featured stories about
the growing call for African-American reparations. All referred to the Holocaust-era
settlements as precedent. In 2000, the ABA Journal, the leading American law maga-
zine, ran a cover story on the subject. See Jeffrey Ghannam, Repairing the Past, 86
A.B.A.J. 39 (Nov. 2000). In late 2000, Johnny Cochran, of the OJ. Simpson trial fame
(together with Harvard law professor Charles J. Ogeltree, Jr. and famed trial lawyer
Alexander J. Pires, Jr.) announced the creation of a new "dream team" to file a class
action suit seeking restitution for African-American slavery. Michael A. Fletcher, Putting
A Price on Slavery's Legacy, WAsti. POST, Dec. 26, 2000, at Al. Cochran also became a full-
fledged member of the wartime restitution bar byjoining Hausfeld's team of Holocaust
lawyers, which previously settled with the Swiss banks, to now prosecute a suit for restitu-
tion against Japan and Japanese corporations for their hostis humani generis activities
during World War II.
77. Those claimants finding their names-or the names of their deceased rela-
tives-on any of the Swiss banks' dormant account lists benefited the most from the
Swiss banks litigation, obtaining, in many instances, awards through the CRT much
higher than U.S.$1,000. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. These claimants,
while constituting the smallest category of recipients of the Swiss banks settlement, had
the strongest legal claims against the Swiss banks. As explained by the Second Circuit,
"these claims are based on well-established legal principles, have the ability of being
proved with concrete documentation, and are readily valuated in terms of time and
inflation. By contrast, the claims of the other four classes are based on novel and unt-
ested legal theories of liability, would have been very difficult to prove at trial, and will
be very difficult to accurately valuate." In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, Nos. 00-
9595(CON), 00-9597 (CON), 2001 WL 868507 (2d Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion).
Moreover, as discussed earlier, the claims for the return of dormant account assets pro-
vided the impetus for the entire Swiss banks litigation and led also to the filing of the
subsequent non-Swiss Holocaust-era claims.
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all in the service of receiving a U.S.$1,000 check. Moreover,
their expectations were raised and then lowered as the harsh re-
ality sunk in that the payments received would only be minimal.
This reality was made even more painful when compared to
the benefits received by other parties involved in the Swiss banks
claims-none of whom were the actual victims of the wartime
misdeeds.
First, the lawyers. A few received fees in the millions.
Others, who took on the cases pro bono, earned their million
dollars and more fees from the subsequently filed German slave
labor litigation.7" To some cynics, the Swiss banks litigation was
seen as a "loss leader"-building the reputation of these lawyers
so that they could take on the subsequent Holocaust-era cases
for a fee.79
Second, the Jewish organizations. The WJC and other Jew-
ish NGOs (non-government organizations) used their work on
the Swiss campaign (and the subsequently-filed claims) not only
to build their prestige in the Jewish community, but also as a
fund-raising tool, headlining their involvement with Holocaust
78. Profits of Doom, HA'ARETZ, June 29, 2001, available at 2001 WL 21430692.
Fifty-one lawyers . . . will receive about $53 million in legal fees, according to
an agreement with the German fund for compensation of Holocaust-era slave
laborers. Nine of these lawyers (all of them Jewish, as are most of the 51) who
were involved in class action suits and in pressuring various firms to reach
general settlements, will pocket over $1 million each.
Id.
79. Professor Neuborne disagrees with my assessment.
I will not defend the morality of the legal fees. I believe that some lawyers
received more than they deserved. In the name of accuracy, though, no fees
have been awarded for the Swiss case. When Judge Korman decides the fee
issue, I predict that almost no fees will be awarded in connection with the
settlement itself, and only hourly fees for time actually expended will be paid
to lawyers for post-settlement work. The net fees in the Swiss case will be very
low. [Paragraph] Calling work on the Swiss case a 'loss leader' is absurd. No
one expected the cases to develop beyond the Swiss litigation, and the Ger-
man cases were always a huge long shot. [Paragraph] Finally, measured as a
percentage of wealth generated, the fees are far below the industry norm.
Moreover, under the arbitration agreement pursuant to which fees were paid
by the German Foundation, all fees were based on time expended, and an
assessment of the value of the services. Generating over $6 billion through a
series of vigorous litigation that consumed more than five years of intense ef-
fort deserves compensation.
Email memo from Burt Neuborne to author (Nov. 27, 2001) para. 5, at 2-3 (on file with
author).
www.swissbankclaims.com
restitution to solicit funds from their members."'
Last, the politicians. Getting on the Holocaust restitution
bandwagon became a popular means to getting votes. Some-
times, it worked (as in the case of Florida Insurance Commis-
sioner-now U.S. Senator Bill Nelson) and sometimes it did not
(as in the case of Senator Alfonse D'Amato's failed reelection
campaign).
To set out the above is not to take away from the hard work
committed by many sincere and dedicated individuals, found in
all these three groups, which forced the Swiss to confront their
wartime past. However, examining what the non-survivors re-
ceived from the Swiss campaign makes the survivors' benefits
seem quite meager.
The campaign also reignited the in-fighting between some
Holocaust survivors and the Claims Conference, the organiza-
tion created after World War II to deal with the postwar claims
against Germany and Austria. Bitter feelings arose among vari-
ous Jewish groups and individual survivors about how to best dis-
tribute the Swiss settlement funds and other monies received
from the later Holocaust-era settlements.
The in-fighting among the various Jewish constituencies
over the restitution settlement spoils, coming on the heels of the
pressure put on the Swiss banks and other European corpora-
tions to make restitution payments, also contributed to the nega-
tive impression that this was all about Jews fighting over money.
A 1998 Swiss government study, for example, found that anti-
Semitism increased in Switzerland in the wake of the campaign
against the Swiss banks81
Lastly, there is one major injustice in the Swiss banks settle-
ment. The settlement unfairly lets the government-owned Swiss
80. A World Jewish Congress ("IAC") mailing began, in bold print: "New U.S.
Government Report Confirms World Jewish Congress' Findings." It continued:
But much work still needs to be done. Your membership contribution today
will help WJC researchers continue their efforts as they examine millions of
files recently declassified by the U.S. government .... And your gift will help
VIJC diplomats to meet with top American, British and French officials to en-
sure that U.S.$70 million in Holocaust gold currently in U.S. and British banks
is returned for the benefit of survivors.
Id.
81. Swiss FEDERAL COMMISSION AGAINST RACISM, ANTI-SEMITISM IN SWITZERLAND: A
REPORT ON HISTORICAL CURRENT MANIFESTATIONS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
COUNTER-MEASURES (1998).
2001] S-101
S-102 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:S-64
National Bank ("SNB") completely off the hook, even though it
was SNB, and not the private Swiss banks, which was the largest
purchaser of gold stolen by the Nazis.
In 1998, soon after the Swiss-government created Bergier
Commission shone the spotlight on the extensive dealings the
SNB had with the Nazis, plaintiffs' attorneys filed a lawsuit
against SNB. 2 The lawsuit detailed both the May 1998, findings
of the Bergier Commission and findings from the 1997, U.S. gov-
ernment about how the SNB blatantly took in gold from the Na-
zis, which it knew to be stolen.8 3
Unfortunately, less than two months later, the same lawyers
who filed the SNB lawsuit with its shocking allegations, and the
WJC representatives, who expressed outrage when the Bergier
Commission findings of SNB's Nazi dealings were issued, now
agreed, in return for the U.S.$1.25 billion, not only to dismiss
the litigation against UBS and Credit Suisse, the two private
banks paying the settlement amount, but also the litigation
against SNB. In fact, the release obtained by the two private
banks went substantially beyond just a dismissal of the New York
federal class action litigation. In addition to releasing the two
class action defendants, the release also insulates from any fu-
ture litigation stemming from World War II "the government of
Switzerland, the Swiss National Bank, all other Swiss banks, and
all other members of the Swiss industry, except for the three
Swiss insurers who are defendants in the [federal class action
Holocaust insurance litigation]."84
One can surely understand the eagerness of the two largest
private Swiss banks-whose fortunes are so closely intertwined
and identified with Switzerland-to purchase legal peace for the
82. Rosenberg v. Swiss National Bank, No. 98CV01647 (D.C. Cir. filed June 29,
1998).
83. See Slany, supra note 4, at 4-5.
84. Settlement Agreement, In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp.
2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). It can also be questioned why Swiss industry also did not par-
ticipate in the settlement by making a contribution to the U.S.$1.25 billion fund. In the
German slave labor settlement, which bought legal peace for Germany and all its pri-
vate enterprises from bothersome U.S. litigation stemming from World War II, over 500
German companies contributed to the U.S.$4.8 billion settlement fund. The Swiss
companies, unlike the German companies, obtained legal peace without having to give
anything in return. The Swiss industry's only financial contribution were token pay-
ments made in 1997 to the U.S.$200 million Swiss Humanitarian Fund, created by the
Swiss government.
2001] www.swissbankclaims.com S-103
entire Swiss nation for all past activities stemming from World
War 11.85 However, plaintiffs' representatives, in their eagerness
during the settlement discussions to conclude the New York liti-
gation against the Swiss banks, gave away too much. Neither the
SNB, nor any other branch of the Swiss government, was even a
party to the New York litigation. Later, when the Swiss govern-
ment was invited to participate in the settlement discussions
before Judge Korman, it declined, claiming that the litigation
was a purely private matter between the two Swiss banks and the
Holocaust survivors. 8" It would have been perfectly reasonable,
therefore, for plaintiffs' representatives to reject the inclusion of
SNB in the settlement.
It can, of course, be debated whether U.S.$1.25 billion suffi-
ciently covers, in today's dollars, the dividends earned by Credit
Suisse and UBS, and the other private Swiss banks which they
acquired during the post-war years, from their wartime dealings
85. Id. The Settlement Agreement defines the scope of claims settled by this litiga-
tion in the following broad terms:
"Claims or Settled Claims means any and all actions ... whether in law, admi-
ralty, or equity, whether class or individual, under any international, national,
state, provincial, or municipal law, whether now accrued or asserted or hereaf-
ter arising or discovered, that may be, may have been, could have been, or
could be brought in any jurisdiction . . . by reason of, or in connection with
any act or omission in any way relating to the Holocaust, World War H and its
prelude and aftermath, Victims or Targets of Nazi Persecution, transactions with or
actions of the Nazi Regime, treatment of refugees fleeing Nazi persecution by the Swiss
Confederation ... or any related cause or thing whatever ....
Id. (emphasis added); The language is ironclad: Switzerland or any Swiss entity, on the
one hand, and World War II or the Holocaust, on the other hand, cannot be men-
tioned in the same breath in any litigation anywhere in the world.
86. Immediately after the settlement, the Swiss government issued a statement in
which it both distanced itself from the result and took pains to confirm that it would
not be contributing any monies to the settlement.
The Federal Council noted today that a settlement was finalized last night be-
tween CS (Credit Suisse) Group, UBS (Union Bank of Switzerland) AG, and
the American plaintiffs. It hopes that this settlement calms the tense situa-
tions of recent months and promotes good economic relations. The precise
content of the settlement is not yet known. The Federal Council has always
stressed that negotiating such a settlement is a matter for the parties affected. Accord-
ingly, it did not take part in these negotiations. For this reason no obligation ensues for
the Swiss Confederation from the settlement....
Declaration of the Swiss Federal Council (Aug. 13, 1998) (emphasis added). Pascal
Couchepin, the Swiss Economics Minister, flatly squelched any hope that the Swiss gov-
ernment would make a contribution to the U.S.$1.25 billion settlement in return for
being given immunity from further civil prosecution as part of the deal: "[T] here is no
reason for the Swiss Government to pay anything." Elizabeth Olson, Swiss Are Relieved,
But Sour, at Banks' Holocaust Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1998, at 8.
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with the Nazis. Some have argued that the figure is too small,
failing to take into account the actual profits made by the banks.
Others have claimed that the U.S.$1.25 billion settlement is fair,
arrived at through hard-fought negotiations with the two banks
over how much they should pay for their dealings with the Nazis
and failure to return dormant accounts. However, there can be
no dispute that the U.S.$1.25 billion fails to cover the profits
earned by SNB in their "Swiss francs for looted Nazi gold"
money-laundering scheme.
The Swiss government-created Bergier Commission esti-
mated that SNB took in from Nazi Germany more than U.S.$2.5
billion in stolen gold (in today's dollars), U.S.$1.2 million of
which could be identified "as being melted down by the Nazi
bankers into gold bars from teeth fillings and wedding rings."
Nevertheless, the Swiss government maintains that the U.S.$68.2
million contribution made by SNB in 1997 to the U.S.$200 mil-
lion Swiss Humanitarian Fund sufficiently covers its obliga-
87tions.
Most furious at the exclusion of SNB from the settlement
were the Holocaust survivors in Israel, the largest group of survi-
vors in the world. Moshe Sanbar, chair of the Center of Organi-
zations of Holocaust Survivors in Israel and the former governor
of the Bank of Israel, protested vehemently at this unfair result.
In a September 1998 letter to Judge Korman, Sanbar urged that
the SNB not be released from liability in the Swiss banks settle-
ment."8 His pleas went unheeded. The lawyers who had earlier
touted the lawsuit against SNB, were now disowning it.89 Sanbar
87. William Hall, Swiss Bank Spurns Nazi Gold Deal, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1998, at 2,
available at 1998 WL 23267472.
88. Marilyn Henry, Israeli Survivors Seek To Keep Options Open Against Swiss National
Bank, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 20, 1998, at 4.
89. Of course, going after the SNB created an additional obstacle not present in
the litigation against the private Swiss banks: as a.government-owned bank, SNB could
assert the defense of sovereign immunity, which the private Swiss banks could not.
Since the lawsuit against SNB was dismissed as part of the overall private Swiss banks
settlement, it is unknown whether SNB's sovereign immunity defense would have been
successful. While sovereign immunity may appear to be a strong defense argument, it
would not necessarily be fatal to the success of the lawsuit. See Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (Argentine National Bank could not avail itself of
the defense of sovereign immunity because its commercial activities, which formed the
basis of the suit, had a "direct effect" in the United States, and therefore Bank not
immune under clause 3 of Section 1605(a) (2) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1330, 1603 et seq., to litigation in United States).
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attempted to have the Jewish groups, specifically the Claims Con-
ference (for which he was Treasurer) fund further studies about
how SNB handled Nazi-looted gold. The WJC, however, vetoed
the proposal. Feeling pressure from all sides, and being accused
of delaying payment to elderly Holocaust survivors due to them
from the Swiss settlement, Sanbar gave in and dropped his for-
mal objections to the settlement.90
To allay criticism of its failure to participate in the Swiss
banks settlement, the Swiss government began making vague
promises about selling gold in its reserves and using the pro-
ceeds to establish a so-called "Solidarity Foundation" to finance
charitable projects, including aid to impoverished Holocaust sur-
vivors throughout the world. However, it maintained that such
sales of the Swiss gold reserves required approval through a ref-
erendum from Swiss voters. The proposal, first floated in March
1997 in the wake of the embarrassing disclosures of Swiss war-
time complicity, was abandoned by mid-1999, 1 as the focus of
the Holocaust restitution campaign turned from the Swiss to
German, Austrian and French companies, and their govern-
ments. The Swiss politicians and bureaucrats were relieved.
Without ever having to defend itself in court and without con-
tributing anything to the settlement, the Swiss government-the
largest money launderer for the Nazis-once again escaped re-
sponsibility for its acts.9 2
CONCLUSION
While acknowledging the above-discussed drawbacks of the
Swiss settlement-and conceding their significance-I still con-
clude that the accomplishments of the Swiss campaign outweigh
its faults. The campaign was an unqualified triumph on the le-
gal and political front, showing the enormous power of both the
American system of justice and the American political process.
90. Sanbar later put his criticisms in a monograph, published in Israel and trans-
lated into English. See RAUL TEITELBAUM & MOSHE SANBAR, HOLOCAUST GOLD-FROM
THE VicriMS TO SWIlTZERLAND: TRAmIs OF THE NAZI PLUNDER (2001).
91. In 1999, the Swiss right-wing parties made a strong showing in parliamentary
elections. That same year, the parties managed to defeat a constitutional amendment
in the Swiss parliament that would have funded the "Solidarity Foundation." See Swiss
Parliament Stalls Gold Foundation, JERUSALEM POST, June 20, 1999, at 4.
92. In March, 1999, Switzerland, no longer under scrutiny for its wartime acts, felt
safe enough to disband the special World War II task force it created to deal with the
wartime activities. See http://www.switzerland.taskforce.ch.
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Combining forces, the lawyers, Jewish activists, and both Jewish
and non-Jewish politicians forced Switzerland and its most pow-
erful industry to confront long-forgotten wrongs and make some
recompense to right those wrongs. In 1995, when the first
soundings of Switzerland's wartime past were coming to light, no
one would have imagined that the powerful Swiss banks would
be forced to disgorge over a billion dollars for their wartime and
post-war misdeeds or that the Swiss government would create his-
torical commissions, task forces, and conduct studies to reevalu-
ate events over a half-century old.
Even more startling was the ability of the Swiss campaign to
open the floodgates to the settlements achieved with Germany
and its industry, Austria and its industry, French banks, Euro-
pean insurance companies, and even American corporations for
their nefarious wartime activities. The worldwide movement for
the return of Nazi-stolen art also was born out of the Swiss banks
settlement. The Swiss campaign-judging by how it is already
being emulated by other movements seeking redress for histori-
cal wrongs-will serve as a model for a long time to come.
The survivors themselves may have won very little. Everyone
else won a lot.
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